

RELIGIOUS-BASED VIOLENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA:
CASE STUDIES OF KADUNA STATE AND THE TALIBAN ACTIVITIES
IN BORNO STATE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

SANUSI ALIYU, MAJ, NIGERIAN ARMY
Bsc. (Hons) Economics, Nigerian Defense Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria, 1996

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2009

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-06-2009		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2008 – JUN 2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Religious-Based Violence and National Security in Nigeria: Case Studies of Kaduna State and the Taliban Activities in Borno State				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Sanusi Aliyu				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This study is on "Religious-Based Violence and National Security in Nigeria: Nigeria is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society with enormous potential for economic, social, and democratic development. However, intense conflicts and violence that manifested within it from its earliest time under colonial rule have made development and elude the country. Nigeria is usually characterized as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are vigorously contested along the lines of complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions. The causes of these conflicts may not be unconnected with the way and manner religion is portrayed to its adherents and mistrust between the followers of the various religious and ethnic groups. The purpose of this study therefore is to examine the phenomenon of religious violence in Nigeria with special focus on some selected violence within Kaduna State and an attack launched against security agencies by a group referred to as Taliban, in Borno State, Nigeria. The study outlines the general background of religious violence in Nigeria, discusses its origin, and highlights the key concepts used in the thesis. The researcher considered the nature, and causes of religious violence in Nigeria, and highlights some of its impact on national security.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Relationship between religion and violence, factors responsible for religious-based violence in Nigeria, religious-based violence and national security, factors militating against the effective management of religious violence in Nigeria, neutralizing the impact of religious conflicts on national security, Kaduna State and Borno State.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 128	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Sanusi Aliyu

Thesis Title: Religious-Based Violence and National Security in Nigeria: Case Studies of Kaduna State and the Taliban Activities in Borno State.

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Douglas Lathrop, MA

_____, Member
Michael Burke, MA

_____, Member
Michael Mihalka, Ph.D.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2009 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

RELIGIOUS-BASED VIOLENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: CASE STUDIES OF KADUNA STATE AND THE TALIBAN ACTIVITIES IN BORNO STATE, by Major Sanusi Aliyu, 128 pages.

This study is on “Religious-Based Violence and National Security in Nigeria: Nigeria is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society with enormous potential for economic, social, and democratic development. However, intense conflicts and violence that manifested within it from its earliest time under colonial rule have made development and elude the country. Nigeria is usually characterized as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are vigorously contested along the lines of complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions. The causes of these conflicts may not be unconnected with the way and manner religion is portrayed to its adherents and mistrust between the followers of the various religious and ethnic groups.

The purpose of this study therefore is to examine the phenomenon of religious violence in Nigeria with special focus on some selected violence within Kaduna State and an attack launched against security agencies by a group referred to as Taliban, in Borno State, Nigeria. The study outlines the general background of religious violence in Nigeria, discusses its origin, and highlights the key concepts used in the thesis. The researcher considered the nature, and causes of religious violence in Nigeria, and highlights some of its impact on national security.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I first of all wish to thank Almighty God for giving me the health, opportunity and courage to write this thesis out of the very tight schedule in the college. I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable contributions of those whose assistance led to the successful completion of this work. I would like to thank my chair, Mr. Douglas Lathrop, for his understanding and tireless effort to make this work a reality, I must also commend the efforts of my first and second readers, Dr. Michael Mihalka and Mr. Michael Burke who accepted to have a more scholarly look at my work throughout the duration of this thesis. They surely have been worthy of the trust I reposed in them.

Finally, I acknowledge with deep appreciation the role played by my loving wife, Mrs. Durrah Akilu Idris, who in the course of my research, stood by me with all her effort and unwavering support to see to the success of this work, in particular and the course in general. She has been my source of strength. My loving daughters, Juwairiah, Anisa and Nabila will never go unmentioned for the understanding, they portrayed to me throughout the course of this research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	ix
ILLUSTRATIONS	x
TABLES	xi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Background.....	1
Root of Conflict in Nigeria	3
Concept of Religion	5
Concept of Violence	7
Concept of Religious Conflicts.....	7
National Security	12
Crisis Management	13
Research Question	15
Secondary Research Question	15
Significance	16
Assumptions.....	16
Scope and Limitations	16
Delimitations.....	17
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	20
Relationship between Religion and Violence	20
Factors Responsible for Religious-Based Violence in Nigeria	25
Religious-Based Violence and National Security.....	29
Neutralizing the Impact of Religious Conflicts on National Security	33
Gap in Literature	36
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	40
The Problem Statement.....	41
Research Design	41

Sources of Data	41
Method of Data Analysis	42
Methods of Data Collection	43
Selection of Research Case Studies	43
Selection, Explanation and Rating of Variables Against the Selected Violence	45
Poverty Occasioned by Unemployment	46
Thomas Carlyle	46
Religious Intolerance	47
Attachment of Ethnicity to Religion	49
Deprivation, Marginalization and Dominance	50
Illiteracy and Ignorance	51
Shari'a Penal Code	52
External Influence	54

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS-BASED VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: CASE STUDIES OF KADUNA AND BORNO STATES59

A Case Study of Kaduna State Ethno-Religious Violence	59
General Background	59
A Survey of Kaduna State	60
The Zangon-Kataf Violence of May 1992	61
Scoring of Variables	63
The Kaduna City Violence of 21 February 2000	65
Scoring of Variables	68
The Gwantu Religious Crisis of November 2001	70
Scoring of Variables	72
Impact of Ethnic and Religious Crises on Kaduna State	75
Economic Impact	75
Social Impact	76
Security Impact	77
Political Impact	77
A Case Study of Taliban Activities In Borno State	78
General Overview of the Taliban Phenomenon	78
Overview of the Taliban of Borno State	79
Objectives of the Group	80
Leadership of the Group	81
Membership	82
Source of Arms and Ammunition	82
Sources of Financial Support	83
Activities and Confrontation with the Police	83
Reactions from the Local Muslim Population	85
Scoring of Variables	85
Measures Adopted by Government to Arrest the Taliban Problem	87
Differences and Commonalities of the Two Case Studies	92
Impact of Religious Violence on the Nigerian State	93
Undermining of National Unity	93

Undermining the Stability of the Nigerian State.....	93
Undermining the Nigeria Police Force and other Security Agencies	94
Mass Killings and Destruction of Economic Activities.....	94
Displacement of Populations and Creation of Refugee Problems	95
Undermining the Nation’s Image Abroad.....	95
 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	 100
Conclusion	100
Recommendations.....	100
Promoting a Culture of Religious Tolerance	101
Alleviation of Illiteracy and Ignorance	102
A Clearly Defined Shari’a Penal Code	102
Good Governance	103
Establishment of National Reconciliation Forum.....	103
Provision of Employment Opportunities and Establishment of Poverty Erradication Programs.....	104
Promoting Bilateral Cooperation on Immigration and Border Security	105
Funding and Logistics.....	105
Close Coordination Between Security Agencies	105
Controlling the Flow of Firearms.....	106
Utilization of Early Warning Signals.....	107
Use of Preventive Intelligence Gathering	107
Research.....	108
Recommendations for Further Study	108
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 110
Books	110
Conference	110
Government Documents	110
Lectures.....	111
Online Sources	111
Periodicals.....	114
Publications.....	114
Reports	114
Surveys.....	115
Other Sources.....	115
 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	 117

ACRONYMS

AFRIGOV	Africa Centre for Democratic Governance
AQ	Al-Qaida
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CASS	Center for Advance Social Science
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICP	Civil and Internal Conflicts Program
CMPM	Christian-Muslim Peace Movement
CP	Commissioner of Police
DPO	Divisional Police Officer
ICRD	Intenational Centre for Religion and Diplomacy
JNI	Jama'atul Nasril Islam (Organization for Islamic Victory)
MPF	Mobile Police Force
MSU-IIL	Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology
NCS	Nigerian Custom Service
NDPVF	Niger Delta People Volunteer Force
NGO	Non Gover nmental Ognization
NIS	Nigerian Immigration Service
NORC	National Opinion Research Center
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NSCS	National Security Coordination Center
RAHS	Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning
SSS	State Security Service

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Map of Nigeria Showing Kaduna and Borno States	3

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Sample Table for Scoring Variable Against the Chosen Case Studies.....	56
Table 2. Comparison of Deaths Recorded and Property Destroyed During the Above Discussed Violence	74
Table 3. Scoring of Variables against the Selected Violence	91

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Nigeria is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multicultural society with enormous potential for economic, social, and democratic development. However, intense conflicts and violence that manifested within it even from its earliest time under the colonial rule have made development and progress elude the country. Nigeria is usually characterized as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are vigorously contested along the lines of complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions.¹ The causes of these conflicts may not be unconnected with the way and manner religion is portrayed to its adherents and mistrust between the followers of the various religious and ethnic groups.

The issues that generate the fiercest contestation include those that are considered fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing groups tend to adopt exclusionary, winner takes all strategies, which include the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship.² As a consequence, deeply divided states tend to be fragile and unstable because, almost by definition, there are fewer points of convergence and consensus among the constituent groups than are required to effectively mitigate or contain the centrifugal forces that tear the society apart.³

It is incontrovertible that ethno-religious and political crises have strong implications for the socio-political and economic developments of Nigeria. This is captured by the comments made by the President of the country when he asserted that:

“Violence has reached unprecedented levels and hundreds have been killed with much more wounded or displaced from their homes on account of their ethnic or

religious identification. Schooling for children has been disrupted and interrupted; businesses have lost billions of naira and property worth much more destroyed.”⁴

The character of the Nigerian State is responsible for the country’s deepening ethno-religious contradictions. This plural nature fuels a constant feeling of distrust between the component units, and the fear of one ethnic or religious group dominating the other is rife.⁵ Even though, the Federal Government of Nigeria has put in a lot of effort in order to solve or reduce the menace of religious conflict in the country, in most cases these efforts have yielded little or no success. Therefore, the government needs to be hyper-active in its approach to its policies on religious-based conflict prevention and resolution.

This research will therefore critically examine the factors that are responsible for religious-based violence in Nigeria and suggest ways on how they can be more effectively mitigated. To achieve its objectives, the research will use case studies of ethno-religious violence in Kaduna State, and the Taliban activities in Borno State, Nigeria. These two states are selected because of the peculiarities of the violence that occurred within them, and also because of how those states are strategically situated within the country.

First, Kaduna State is used as a case study largely due to its centrally located position within the country. The state has an almost equal population of Muslims and Christians, which makes it extremely catastrophic whenever there is a crisis between the two religious denominations. Also, the destruction of lives and property in such instances can be enormous. Secondly, Borno State is used as a case study because it is a border state and therefore any violence within the state might spill over to the neighboring countries. There is also the likelihood of religious violence being fueled or sponsored

from outside the country. The following map shows the locations of Kaduna and Borno States.




Figure 1. Map of Nigeria Showing Kaduna and Borno States

Source: Nigeria Masterweb, Map, <http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/TearsOfMyPeople.html> (accessed 19 March 2009).

Root of Conflict in Nigeria

As mentioned in paragraph one above, the roots of conflicts in Nigeria lie in her past history when the British colonial masters, after partitioning the geographic entity that

was later to become Nigeria into the Northern and Southern Protectorates, amalgamated them with little concern for the ethnic groupings. The partitioning consequently encouraged separate developments for constituent ethnic units. The arrangement was simply to suit the colonialists.⁶ They failed to pay due attention to the regional, cultural and political differences and inequalities but rather employed the principle of “divide and rule” to their advantage. Even their idea of the formation of the security agencies, including the armed forces, was to have a standing military force that would protect the interests of the colonial trading companies.⁷

Successive indigenous governments after independence did not perform much better in spite of concerted nationalist efforts by some of them to propagate the principles of “unity in diversity.”⁸ Tribalism, nepotism and financial recklessness became the trademark of these governments. The elitist political class that evolved was so parochial that national issues were pushed to the background for tribal and regional interests. Disagreement in the Federal House and brazen disregard for the unity of the nation by the political class provided an opportunity for some military officers to take over power from the First Republic politicians in 1966.

The entry of the military into the polity of Nigeria opened another phase of conflict rather than solving the problem, as negative intents were read into the actions of the then head of the military, Aguiyi Ironsi.⁹ Ironsi had tried to legislate against the divisive tendencies in the country because of the slow pace of the federal constituency framework in bringing about the expected national unity and co-existence in the country.¹⁰ Aguiyi Ironsi was killed and a series of combined political, economic and

ethnic factors led to the Nigeria-Biafra war (civil war), which was the first conflictual challenge to the nation.¹¹

Since the end of the civil war in the late 1960s, Nigeria has experienced many other conflicts of varying proportions and origins. Apart from those inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic based conflicts, there has been and still are existing conflicts based on religious differences. Examples include the Kano riot of 19 October 2001, the Kaduna riot of February 2002, political conflicts like the one that trailed the 2003 elections and the economic and unequal distribution of resources in the Region of Niger Delta or self-determination issues like the Ogoni conflict in the Niger Delta region. It is noted that ethnic and regional tensions often overlap with religious differences making it difficult to differentiate amongst them.

Concept of Religion

The term religion comes from either the Latin word *religare* (meaning to read or pursue together; the same roots goes to legible and intelligent), or much more likely and generally accepted, from the term *religare* (to tie back, to find fast). Hence a religious man used to mean a monk tied by his vow; and the words “to bring home, ligaments and ligatures” go back to the same root.¹² For the Romans, it meant being tied back, staying connected with ancestral customs and beliefs, a kind of ancestor loyalty. Religion is value-based; as such people are usually emotionally attached to it and less tolerant of any unwelcome attack upon it.

Religion suggests an attempt by man to work out a relationship with a super-ordinate being often epitomized in God. Implicit in this is an interaction between religion and the society within which it functions. Consequently, because of its tendency to color

relationships, religion has become a major influence in politics and crises, playing significant roles in the entire societal process especially in multi religious societies. For the early Christians, the word would originally have meant being tied back, or being connected to God. As used in Arabic and therefore in Islamic literature, religion means obedience, being in debt, restoring one's rights, adopting as a habit, forcing, calling to account, managing, rewarding or punishing, serving, lending and so on.¹³ It can also be seen as a community of persons united by faith, united by a search for "the divine," and defined by its manner of confronting the problems of human existence.

The definitions and perception that people have accorded to religion have not only differed from one historical epoch to another, but have also varied from one conventional wisdom to another. It is against this background that Marx conceived religion as "the sigh of the oppressed creature. It is the opium of the people." The foregoing definition of religion by Marx presupposes that religion is not only a mental abstraction but also an immaterial object of drowsiness. To him, religion not only blurs the true class consciousness and rational ability of masses but further injects into them an aura and ecstasy.¹⁴

The above views of religion depict religion as something to be denied or dismissed as belonging to the past phase of human development. In reality, however, despite the advances in science and technology, there is a growing interest in and turning towards religion throughout the world. The collapse of communist systems has opened the gates for the return of religion to the former communist societies. All of these show that western theories of religion have been largely flawed, as religion is a rising value in the world and more people are turning to it every day. For the purpose of this study,

religion is understood as the search, inherent in man, which the spirit makes in order to apprehend the infinite, the longing and endeavor of the individual with regard to his sense of unfulfilled desire for infinity.¹⁵

Concept of Violence

The term violence has attracted a wide range of definitions in literature. The Princeton Cognitive Science Laboratory defines it as “an act of aggression (as one against a person who resists); a turbulent state resulting in injuries and destruction; ferocity: the property of being wild or turbulent.”¹⁶ Violence is an integral part of man’s existence and a common occurrence in human societies. It could be due to differences in political ideologies, as was evident during the Cold War period, and terrorism, bad governance, ethnic nationalism, economic and religious reasons, and in some cases a combination of two or more of these factors.¹⁷

A more comprehensive definition is that of Cadfy who defines it as “physical and non physical harm that causes damage, pain, injury or fear.”¹⁸ However, while violence may be physical or non-physical, and while it’s immediate target may be either human beings or material structures, its ultimate goal is usually to destroy the existence or degrade the dignity of a person or group of persons. This definition is considered sufficiently comprehensive and is therefore adopted for the purpose of this study.

Concept of Religious Conflicts

Religious conflicts can be described as disagreement based on differences in faith and belief.¹⁹ Most conflicts, referred to as religious in Nigeria may also be ethnically based, as well. Ethnic conflicts usually revolve around resource conflicts in which the

conflicting groups have different distinct cultural identities. Obviously, these conflicts are not confined to any specific geo-political region of Nigeria or any part of the world.

Religious violence is a term that covers all phenomena where religion, in any of its forms, is either the subject or object of individual or collective violent behavior.

Concretely, it covers both violence by religiously motivated individuals or religious institutions of any kinds, a different sect, or secular targets.²⁰ Religious violence, like all violence, is inherently a cultural process whose meanings are context dependent. It may be worth noting that religious violence often tends to place great emphasis on the symbolic aspect of the act.²¹

Religious conflicts are recurring phenomena affecting the security of many countries around the world. In a study conducted to investigate the causes of most violent conflicts, religion was found to be a crucial issue.²² The study found that societies that are divided along religious lines are more prone to intense and prolonged conflict than countries where people have problems arising from political, territorial and ethnic divisions.²³ The explanation for this may lay in the belief among many believers that it is only by strict adherence to the religion that they could attain self-purification and divine acceptance in the hereafter. Religious convictions can be so strongly held that, to some adherents, it becomes a matter of life and death. Or, it could be as simple as a person's religion being used as a convenient way of differentiating himself from someone else, especially when both are in competition for resources.

The global security environment has witnessed many religious-based conflicts in contemporary times. In India, bloody confrontations between Hindus and Muslims have frequently led to insecurity in the sub-region and even the establishment of new nation

states like Pakistan and Bangladesh. The violent religious crises in countries like Northern Ireland, Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia underline the seriousness of religious-based violence. The phenomenon of religious-based violence does not only manifest itself in inter-religious settings but can also be found within adherents of the same religion. This can be seen in the case of Northern Ireland, for instance, where Christians of the Catholic and Anglican denominations battle each other. Similarly, rivalries between the Muslim sub-sects of Sunni and Shiites in Iraq, Yemen and Saudi Arabia have always been fierce and bloody.

Nigeria, one of the largest and most important countries in the less developed world, has been in the news in the last fifteen years as a major African theatre of religious violence and aggression, as has Sudan. A religious divide separates Christians and Muslims, and long-standing intra religious conflicts further divide the people. The imperfect distribution of adherents to Islam and Christianity is complicated by ethnic differences as well. The religious crises in various parts of Nigeria have continued to pose serious threats to its national security. Apart from recording heavy loss of lives, destruction of property and displacement of citizens, the problem becomes complicated as regards the choice of targets and the types of weapons deployed during these crises.²⁴

The use of weapons during such crises “encourages reprisal killings, which spark off new rounds of violence between warring groups.”²⁵ This situation inhibits the ability of security agencies to quickly defuse the crises and restore law and order. Thus, there is a tendency for the crises to escalate and become prolonged. As a result of these crises, large numbers of lives and property were lost and the States are seen by many people

outside them as no go areas. Businesses are struggling to survive due to lack of investment directly resulting from the overall lack of security.

In Nigeria, an unprecedented number of conflicts arising from mostly religious-based disputes have been witnessed in some parts of the country since 1999. It has been estimated that since the transition to civilian rule in May 1999, no less than ten thousand lives have been lost to religious-based violence.²⁶ Many of these conflicts were basically between Christians and Muslims, although there have been cases where members of the same sect engaged in violent conflict because of different interpretations of the holy books. Nevertheless, the most frequent religious conflicts have been those between Muslims and Christians like the ones that occurred in places like Sagamu in Ogun State, Lagos, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, and the attacks that were unleashed in Yobe and Borno States by groups referred to as Taliban. These conflicts threaten to transform religion in Nigeria from a unifying and edifying force into a destructive or even disintegrative social element, threatening the peace, stability and security of the country and beyond.

Most of the religiously-motivated violence in the country in recent times has centered on the introduction of the Shari'a penal code in some northern states of Nigeria. Kaduna State has had several religious crises during the last decades such as the Kafanchan crisis in 1999, the Shari'a crisis in 2000, the Gwantu crisis of 2001, and the Kaduna Miss World crisis in 2002, just to mention but a few. A common trend of these crises is that they start as an ethnic one and quickly dovetail into a religious one. A common characteristic to all these crises is the massive destruction of lives and property, and also the way they spill over to neighboring towns or other parts of Nigeria, disruption

of productive activities, sabotage, violent confrontation with security agencies and reprisal killings.

These crises are eloquent manifestations of threats to national security as they could inhibit peace and security of any country. They are also injurious and prejudicial to individual and corporate interests of the citizenry and the sovereignty of the nation. Ethnic and religious crises disrupt public order and undermine individual safety thus creating insecurity. These situations disrupt normal productive activities which erode public confidence in government to provide security and safeguard lives and property.²⁷ Furthermore, in 2003, Borno State in the northeastern part of Nigeria witnessed serious incidents of religious-based conflicts as a result of the emergence of a group of Muslim fundamentalists, which identified themselves as Taliban of Nigeria.

The Nigerian Taliban first came to public notice in December 2003 when they launched a short-lived rebellion, seizing control of an area of farmlands and semi-desert area on Nigeria's northern border with Niger. Believed by commentators to have an affiliation with the Taliban of Afghanistan, they attacked several non-Muslim communities, police stations, and other government establishments, raised the Afghan flag and declared independence.²⁸ The short-lived uprising was brought down after the intervention by the Nigerian Armed Forces.²⁹ Even though the conflict with the group was brief, reports that a Taliban cell had been established in Nigeria raised concerns in the international circles as to whether Nigeria was becoming a base for terrorist organizations.³⁰ It was the concern for the implications of these activities on Nigeria's security and her international relations that sparked the researcher's interest in this study.

National Security

The core interest of Nigeria's national defense policy is to ensure the nation's survival and security. National security entails a condition, in which citizens of a country enjoy a free, peaceful, and safe environment, and have access to resources which will enable them to enjoy the basic necessities of life.³¹ Thus, the security of a state directly translates to its ability to protect its citizens, as well as national assets, from both internal and external threats. It also facilitates individuals and groups in carrying out their legitimate businesses without any significant undue hindrance. A nation's security may be undermined by either external or internal conflicts or violence resulting from social, political, religious, and economic misunderstandings within it.

National security, as a more specific concept, implies the absence of threat to life, property, and socio-economic well being of a nation and its people. It is described by Imobighe, as freedom from danger, or from threats to a nation's ability to protect and defend itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests, and enhance the well being of its people.³² Accordingly, it embraces not only the establishment of protective measures to safeguard persons, property and information from every form of danger, but also to guarantee the peace and tranquility as well as the welfare of its citizens.

From this selection of definitions, two broad perspectives can be identified. First, there is the traditional perspective in which national security is perceived as the state of military preparedness to defend a country against external threats. Second, there is the more recent and broader conceptualization of national security which encompasses, besides the state of military preparedness, such other dimensions as political security,

economic security, social security and environmental security which impact on the quality of life or well being of the population.

This broader view, therefore, regards national security as the ability of a country to maintain its sovereignty, protect its political, economic, social and other interests in a sovereign manner and act likewise in its relations with other states in the international system. It follows then, that national security entails the protection of all the national interests upon which the survival of the country depends. It is not only about the security of national territory and infrastructure but also, about the good life, the basic values which keep the community together and advancement in the quality of life available to the individual.³³

Crisis Management

Management as a process can be thought of as a series of functions that brings about desired results in an efficient manner. The process provides an organized means of achieving what an individual or organization wants. The effort made to keep a crisis under control through effective management constitutes what is regarded as crisis management. Crisis management is, concerned on one hand, with procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand (either through miscalculation and mistakes by the participant or because events take a logic and momentum of their own) and lead to war, and on the other with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected.³⁴ From the above conceptualization, it is clear that crisis management involves the attempt to control events during a crisis to prevent significant and systematic violence and or physical destruction from occurring.

Approaches to crisis management could be of 2 types namely, a reactive approach or a pro-active approach. A reactive approach presupposes an approach that waits until a crisis erupts into violence before mechanisms are put in place to restore law and order or normalcy. For Nigeria, this is basically the approach normally taken. Enahoro observes that in Nigeria, a crisis erupts into violence and security forces are required to be deployed to restore law and order. He further observes that this may be followed by an inquiry (judicial or otherwise) or such options available to government. Even in a situation where government has a fore-knowledge of the crisis that is about to erupt, the government action could still be termed to be reactive because what the government does is to act in response to intention of the disputant.³⁵

The pro-active approach to crisis management, on the other hand, connotes those measures adopted towards preventing the eruption of a crisis and measures ensuring that the crisis is resolved satisfactorily. In this approach, counter measures are put in place to respond to a crisis rather than wait for it to erupt and then intervene to restore law and order. Enahoro also points out that there are political, social and economic activities available for crisis management, which can be harnessed in managing a crisis effectively. He notes that the political direction, on which the crisis management process revolves, is perhaps a manifestation of the need to consider all of its ramifications and arrive at a management solution that best serves the yearnings and aspirations of the citizens.³⁶ Thus, a crisis can be effectively managed only when warring factions in the crisis recognize and understand the problems and demands of the crisis and that a mutually agreeable solution can be found to it. From the foregoing discussion, it becomes

obvious that different strategies are employed to manage a crisis depending on whether or not open conflict has occurred, its intensity, pattern and consequences.

However, where crisis has erupted, the appropriate management strategy should be through settlement. A crisis, not properly controlled or managed, tends to become chaotic and may transform into violence. Most of the crises in Nigeria have been violent and multifaceted, difficult to manage and resolve.

Research Question

The primary research question for this thesis is: What are the factors responsible for religious-based violence in Nigeria and how they can be more effectively mitigated?

Secondary Research Question

The secondary research questions of this thesis are designed to proffer solution to the primary question. These are:

1. How does religious-based violence impact on Nigeria's national security?
2. What are the origins, objectives and nature of the Taliban phenomenon in Borno State, and religious crises in Kaduna State?
3. What is the impact of Kaduna religious crises and the Taliban activities on national security?
4. What are the challenges militating against the effective management of religious violence in Nigeria?
5. What strategies could be adopted to minimize or neutralize the impact of this phenomenon on Nigeria's national security?

Significance

This thesis is considered significant because it seeks to throw light on the phenomenon of religious-based violence in Nigeria, using Kaduna State and the Taliban operations in Borno State as case studies. The thesis can serve as a useful guide to policy makers on how best to tackle the issue of religious violence in the country. Furthermore, the international community will be more aware of Nigeria's policy on religious-based violence. Finally, it can help other researchers and scholars in carrying out further research on the same or similar topics.

Assumptions

It is assumed that:

1. If nothing concrete is done by the Nigerian government, there is bound to be more religious conflicts in the country.
2. Unless various religious leaders show commitment and interest in sensitizing their followers on the need for religious tolerance, religious violence will continue to occur.

Scope and Limitations

The study will cover the period from 1992 to 2004. The choice of the time frame was informed by the fact that since 1992, there have been records of large-scale religious violence in Nigeria up to 2005. However, special emphasis shall be placed on the period 2003–2004, being the period that witnessed the first manifestations of Taliban activity in Nigeria. Religion is a very sensitive issue and as such, opinions may be based on

individuals' personal views and perception. Also, it will be difficult for the researcher to conduct interviews with relevant interest groups.

Delimitations

The delimitation of this thesis will be that, the study will not cover the crises that occurred before 1992 as most of the crises that are serious in nature happened between 1992 and 2004. Also, interviews will not be conducted during the course of this research work. Furthermore, the researcher will limit his findings to the religious conflicts that occurred in Kaduna and Borno States.

¹E. Osaghae Eghosa, *A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria*, <http://www.crise.ox.uk/pubs/workingpaper6.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2009).

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ali Arazeem Abdullahi, and Saka L, *Ethno-Religious and Political Conflicts: Threat to Nigeria Nascent Democracy*, <http://www.unilorin.edu.ng/unilorin/publications/Ethno.pdf> (accessed 28 March 2009).

⁵Lanre Olu-Adeyemi, *Ethno-Religious Conflicts And The Travails of National Integration In Nigeria's Fourth Republic*, <http://www.dawodu.com/adeyemi3.htm> (accessed 26 January 2009).

⁶O.B.C. Nwolise, "Military Leadership In Nigeria" *Nigeria Political Leadership Handbook and Who's Who* (Polcrom Limited, Lagos, 1992), 75.

⁷Thomas A. Imobighe, *Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria* (Spectrum Book Limited, Ibadan 2003), 5.

⁸Ibid., 4.

⁹Ibid., 5.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Nwolise, *Military Leadership in Nigeria*, 74.

¹²*Religion in the West*, <http://islambyquestion.net/religion/west.html> (accessed 6 December 2008).

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Karl, H. Marx, *Critique of the Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, http://quotationspage.com/quotes/Karl_Marx/ (accessed 6 December 2008).

¹⁵*Scientology: Religion and Spirituality in Society*, <http://www.accepteds Scientology.net/page04.htm> (accessed 6 December 2008).

¹⁶*Theorizing Peace Education*, <http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cac> (accessed 6 December 2008).

¹⁷Peter, J. *Ethnic and Religious Conflicts: Europe and Asia* (Dartmouth: Basic Books Inc, 1994), 13.

¹⁸*Theorizing Peace Education*, <http://henry.ub.uit.no/munin/bitstream/10037/149/1/thesis.pdf> (accessed 8 April 2009).

¹⁹M. Dentsch, "The Principles and Process of conflict," *Ife Psychology* 9, no. 3 (2001), 4.

²⁰Wikipedia, "Religious Violence-Wikipedia." *the Free Encyclopedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/Wiki/Religious_violence (accessed 26 October 2008).

²¹*Ibid.*

²²Marta, R. *Religion, Ethnicity, Political System and Civil War* (Bellatarra-Barcelona, Spain: Institute of Analysis Economic)

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Dalhata Ja'afar, *Investigation Panel Report on Kaduna Religious Crises of February and May 2000*, 8.

²⁵National War College, *Report of National Workshop on Ethnic Militias, Democracy and National Security* (Abuja 2006), 5.

²⁶Presidential Committee, *Memorandum Submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria*, (8 February 2002).

²⁷Buhari S.B, *Intelligence Gathering in Crisis Situation*, Lecture Delivered to Course 13, National War College, Abuja, (23 April 2003), 11.

²⁸Stefan Hartwig, *Tension in Nigeria*, <http://www.wordiq.com> (accessed 20 September 2008).

²⁹Obed Minchaku, *Islamic Sect in Nigeria Attacks on Villagers*, <http://www.wordiq.article/Taliban.com> (accessed 20 September 2008).

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Major General (Rtd) DO Enahoro, *Path to Understanding Military Strategy*, A Lecture Delivered at the National War College, Abuja Nigeria, to Participants of Course 13 (20 October 2004).

³²TA Imobighe, *Doctrines for and Threats for Internal Security*, in Ekoko, A. and Vpgt, M. (eds) *Nigerian Defense Policy: Issues and Problems* (Lagos: Malthouse Press 1990), 224.

³³Are, LLK. *Meeting the Challenges of National Security*, A Lecture Delivered at the National War College, Abuja, (January 2002).

³⁴P. William, *Crisis Management*, in Baylis, J, et al, *Contemporary Strategy*, (New York Holmes and Meier, 1987), 157.

³⁵DO.Enahoro, *Mechanism of Intra-State Crisis in Africa*, in Garuba CA (ed), *Capacity Building for Crisis Management in Africa* (Abuja: National War College, 1998), 189.

³⁶Ibid., 185.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter one dealt with general background of religious violence in Nigeria, and also highlighted the key concepts used in this thesis. This chapter reviews and discusses relevant literature written in relation to the key research questions of this thesis. These are the relationship between religion and violence; factors responsible for religious-based violence in Nigeria; religious-based violence and national security; and neutralizing the impact of religious conflicts on national security. Discussions on these key subjects become essential for a better understanding of religious violence as a global phenomenon.

The primary sources of literature on the subject are articles, books, existing write-ups and journals that are related to the topic. A number of books and articles have been written on the subject matter therefore, a critical review of the existing sources was made possible. In doing so, effort was exerted on conceptualizing the various aspects of the thesis in order to enhance the understanding of the issues that would be raised in the course of this research. It also attempts to scrutinize the variables in the subject matter with a view to establishing the relationship between them. Specifically, this chapter provides an overview of other relevant research works with a view to clarifying the gap in knowledge that this study seeks to fill.

Relationship between Religion and Violence

Violence induced by religious differences is often referred to as religious violence. Acts of violence by groups and movements have brought into focus the need to

study and understand what constitutes religious violence. There are groups linked to orthodox religious organizations that use violence as a tool or means of getting attention.

The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, by Mark Juergensmeyer, University of California Press, 1993. The author of the book is the Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies, professor of sociology, and affiliate professor of religious studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is an expert on religious violence, conflict resolution and South Asian religion and politics, and has published more than two hundred articles and twenty books, including the recently-released *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State* (University of California Press 2008). In this book, the author paints a provocative picture of the new religious revolutionaries altering the political landscape in the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. Impassioned Muslim leaders in Egypt, Palestine, and Algeria, political rabbis in Israel, militant Sikhs in India, and triumphant Catholic clergy in Eastern Europe are all players in Juergensmeyer's study of the explosive growth of religious movements that decisively reject Western ideas of secular nationalism. According to him,

Groups such as Hamas, Khaliatan Movement, Christian Identity, and Jewish Right Wing have used violence to draw attention to them and also articulate the concerns of those within their wider cultures.¹

Such violent acts have been considered by their cohorts as perhaps intemperate, but understandable.

World Council of Churches' Conference, Eckerd College, St. Petersburg, Florida, February, 8-12, 2002 was a conference organized by an international fellowship of Christian churches built upon the foundation of encounter, dialogue and collaboration.

During the conference, the fellowship described how some religious groups condemn violence while others encourage and justify its usage. The conference opined that;

Religious traditions can be resources for building peace and at the same time, religious communities often play a role in advocating and justifying violence. In the face of structural violence, religious traditions should help us to overcome the lust for power, control, and possession of material goods that are the driving impulses of violence and violent systems.²

The conference went further to characterize the relationship between violence and religion as follows:

Silence: Religious communities often maintain silence in the face of violence. There are many reasons for such silence, including, the concern for the survival of their own communities and structures. Some may also see their role helping their adherents feel satisfied in the status quo and in their own material prosperity without a concern for the marginalized.

Sanctification: Religious communities justify the use of violence by the state or extra state entities or by other agencies. Examples of this would be when a religious tradition attaches itself to the militaristic objectives of the state and the textual or canonical legitimization of violence against women.

Expansion: Religious communities use violence for purposes of spreading themselves or of ensuring their own growth.

Images of God: Some religious traditions have violent images of the Divine, which may have problematic implications for the self-understanding of their believers.

Images of Self: Religious traditions promote violence by framing the worth of their adherents in terms of the 'lesser worth' of others.³

One point here is that the perpetrators of these violent acts are rarely different from the orthodox groups or mainstream religious groups. It is not their spirituality that is unusual but their religious ideas, cultural context and world views. These new religious movements are, in reality, religious responses to social situations and the expression of deeply held convictions.

Religion: A Secular Theory, New York: Free Press, 1982, is a wonderful book by Andrew M. Greeley, one of the most influential Catholic thinkers and writers of the time. As a priest, sociologist, author and journalist, Greeley has built an international

assemblage of devout fans over a career that spans five decades. He is the author of over 50 best-selling novels and more than 100 works of non-fiction and his writing has been translated into 12 languages. A Professor of Sociology at the University of Arizona and a Research Associate with the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, Father Greeley is a respected scholar whose current research focuses on the Sociology of Religion. According to him;

In some circumstances religious stories and religious groupings validate and confirm the dominant social perspective. In other circumstances, religious stories and religious groupings are at odds with the dominant perspective, and they can even attempt to destroy it. One reason for this dual tendency of religion is that the theologies of most long-established religions are so diverse and complex that they can be interpreted to justify both quietism and violence.⁴

Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley:

University of California Press, 2001, by Mark Juergensmeyer. This book affirmed that; studying the connection between religion and violence involves examining a variety of distinct issues and relationships. However, while violence is not the monopoly of religious individuals or groups, religion has been found to provide more room and symbols that make bloodshed possible. Also, the ideas and justifications for violence are not a monopoly of one religious tradition because all religions are, in one way or another, inherently revolutionary. Some of the violent assaults on public or international order by some recent religious groups have been attributed to the following reasons:

1. Perception of an anti-religious international political conspiracy;
2. Enthronement of an oppressive global economic order-mentioned by Osama Bin Laden, Shimkyo and Christian Militia.⁵

These trends have fuelled the growth of groups which appear to be violent religious sects but may more fundamentally be anti-globalization guerrillas. The activities of such groups continue to threaten both national and global security.

Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, by Mark Juergensmeyer, explores the use of violence by marginal groups within five major religious traditions: Christianity (reconstruction theology and the Christian Identity movement, abortion clinic attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing, and Northern Ireland); Judaism (Baruch Goldstein, the assassination of Rabin, and Kahane); Islam (the World Trade Center bombing and Hamas suicide missions); Sikhism (the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Beant Singh); and Buddhism (Aum Shinrikyo and the Tokyo subway gas attack). Juergensmeyer interviews participants in and advocates of violence (notably Mike Bray, Yoel Lerner, Mahmud Abouhalima, Simranjit Singh Mann, and an anonymous ex-member of Aum Shinrikyo), but he is less interested in individual psychology than in "cultures of violence", broadly construed. A particular focus is on the theological justifications for violence and the bases for its authorization. Overall the treatment is not, except perhaps in the area of theology, much deeper than that of (quality) newspaper reporting, but it is insightful and treats the different religious traditions side by side.

The second part of the book looks at common themes and patterns in the cultures of violence described above. One is the idea of violence as performance, with symbolism often taking precedence over more strategic considerations in such matters as choice of targets and dates; there are obvious connections with religious ritual. Another theme is the placing of violence within the context of a cosmic war, a symbolic and transcendent

conflict; accompanying this, the movement's casualties become martyrs and their opponents are demonized. Religious violence has much to do with the nature of the religious imagination, which has always had the propensity to project images of cosmic war. It also has much to do with the social tensions of this moment of history that cry out for absolute solutions, and the sense of personal humiliation experienced by men who longed to restore an integrity that they perceive as lost in the wake of virtually global social and political shifts. Related to this is the valorization of the warrior (religious violence often involves ex-military personnel), coupled with male bonding and an appeal to men "on the margins." Juergensmeyer comments in passing that only in terrorist groups motivated by secular political ideologies have women taken an active part. Apart from this there is no attempt at a comparison between religious and secular terrorism, something which might have made the common features of religious terrorism clearer.

Juergensmeyer concludes *Terror in the Mind of God* with suggestions for the future of religious violence that are certain to be controversial, arguing that "the cure for religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself" and in acknowledgement of religion in public life.

Factors Responsible for Religious-Based Violence in Nigeria

The factors contributing to the upsurge of religious-based violence in Nigeria have been analyzed extensively by various scholars.

Federalism State and Religion in Nigeria, by Ogbu U Kalu. Kalu served as Professor of Church History for over two decades at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He has authored several books and articles on the history of the Church in Nigeria and

throughout Africa. He is currently the Henry Winters Luce Professor of World Christianity and Missions at McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago. In this writeup, the author proffered three major and other lesser explanations for the upsurge in religious militancy and violence in Nigeria since the 1980s. They could be referred to as the religious explanation, the conspiratorial explanation and the Lubeck model.⁶

According to him, the religious explanation starts from the premise that the 1980s was a unique period in Nigeria's history. A survey of socio-economic policies of the period 1975-1993 indicates a massive effort by the central government to improve the economy, extend the range of social infrastructure, revitalize agriculture, bring government to the grassroots, detribalize the political culture, pander to religious groups and create more states. The second explanatory school, or what may be called the *conspiratorial model*, emphasizes that the architects of religious violence since the 1980, have had hidden political agendas, informed by the historical indoctrination that religion and history cannot be established without political supremacy. According to this line of thought, there is need to

1. Rebel against injustice and oppression (seen as embedded in the Christian orientation of modern Nigerian structures).
2. Establish an Islamic state at an opportune time.
3. Replace or purify a corrupt Muslim leadership.

Furthermore, it added that the Northern political elite harnessed the activities of the young revivalists for the advancement of this broad agenda and that external funding and inspiration accentuated this political agenda. The third model, which is the *Lubeck model*, focuses on the socio-economic roots of religious-based violence.

Islam in Nigeria: Its Concept, Manifestation and Role in Nation Building, is a chapter written by Umar, S.M. within *Nigeria Since Independence: the First Twenty Five Years*, (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989), by Ashiwaju, G and Abubakar, Y. (eds). In this book, Umar has pointed out that there was a loss of confidence in the Islamic elite by fellow Muslims.⁷ Deeply engrossed in material acquisition, they rode rough-shod over prohibition of usury in their economic sphere. He further points out that the legal manifestation of Islam was also destroyed because the elite could not enforce the tenets of Islamic Law. Thus, in spite of a proliferation of mosques, there was little observance of moral precepts. The Islamic scholars engaged in archaic abstractions.

Educational and or intellectual manifestations appeared so helpless and impotent that they could not control deviations. In spite of the formation of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, richly endowed by the Pakistani, Yusuf Fardi, the Council failed to be effective in mustering sufficient authority and influence. Thus, the baton was passed to students, the unemployed youth and exploitative Islamic scholars to protect Islam in the way they knew best. The rise of charismatic Pentecostals who dared into the Muslim North with greater confidence and acquired followers also exacerbated matters. Similarly, the rise of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) achieved strange results. It brought Christians in the North and South together and this mass and ecumenical unification raised alarms of immense political importance.

Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, is an article written by Ukoha Ukiwo, a research fellow with the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. This article examines the explosion of violent ethno-religious

and communal conflicts in Nigeria, contrary to the widespread expectation that the inauguration of the civilian administration would usher in democratic stability. The article stated that

The nature of the politics of the transition program and the reluctance of the post-military regime to address the national question has led to the resurgence of social groups that make demands for incorporation and empowerment.⁸

The central argument in author's opinion is that unbridled competition for power, and the failure of government to deliver democratic dividends, have resulted in violent conflicts, especially between ethnic and religious groups, endangering the country's nascent democracy. According to the author, good governance, especially accountability, transparency and equity, would restore governmental legitimacy, inter-ethnic and religious harmony and promote democratic consolidation.

Ethno-Religious Conflicts and The Travails of National Integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic by Lanre Olu-Adeyemi of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria. According to him, the character of the Nigerian State is responsible for the country's deepening ethno-religious contradictions. This plural nature originates a constant feeling of distrust between the component units and the fear of one ethnic or religious group dominating the other is rife. A pattern of largely discernible ethnic suspicion and intrigue that had existed prior to independence in 1960 led to the military coup d'état of 1966, the traumatic civil war between 1967 and 1970, mutual distrust afterwards, the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections and the incessant ethno-religious skirmishes that are presently threatening the very fabric of Nigeria's nascent democracy and national existence.

The elite have sacrificed opportunities for initiating national integration on the altar of short-term interest, thus compounding the problem. Consequently, in spite of the creation of several states and local governments, a new national anthem and pledge, new constitutions and form of government, the state remained plagued with conflicting interests that poses the threat of been intractable. At the center of discussion is the problem of intolerant ethnic diversities and religious worldviews which are continually expressed in the series of violent crises that occurs at quick succession in Nigeria's body politic.⁹

Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria, Jos: African Centre for Democratic Governance (AFRIGOV) (2001), by B.S. Egwu. He posited that;

The constant political, ethnic and religious violence that characterized the Nigerian state is attributable to the history and processes inherent in the state formation during the colonial and postcolonial era. The colonial state was the foundation upon which the post colonial state was built; therefore the process of ethnic identity formation and the political use to which such identity is put were determined by this process. Presently, the Nigerian state, he argues, is a violent institution and to a large extent a crisis generating mechanism because the development of a bourgeois nation-state based on respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the institutionalization of democratic order and governance was not the priority of the colonialists in building the Nigerian state.¹⁰

Religious-Based Violence and National Security

The incidence of ethno-religious violence has undermined national security in several countries. In Sudan, there has been a long-drawn conflict, driven by a significant ethnic component. In India, there have been repeated conflicts between Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and Animist. In East Timor, there has been a long running conflict between Christians and Muslims, although the situation now appears to be stable.

In each of these countries, and indeed, in so many other countries where religion has been a factor in violence, this phenomenon has tended to undermine national security.

The incidence of conflict damages national infrastructure undermines social coercion among the groups that make up the country and diverts resources from the real needs of national development.

Furthermore, by creating an image of insecurity in the country, religious-based violence instigates the flight of human capital and alienates the entry of foreign capital investment often so crucial to national development, especially in developing countries. In sum, therefore, it can be said that religious-based violence, like most other forms of violence, undermines national security and development. Given the inherent dangers and threats posed by religious violence the world over, and the most damaging effect it has on a nation's security, a lot of literature has been written on issues related to this subject matter by organizations, individual authors and researchers, publications and interest groups.

The Strategic Framework for National Security: by National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), 2004 is a very interesting and valuable publication by the Singaporean NSCS, which vividly outlines the key structures, security measures and capability development programs that would assist Singapore in curtailing and dealing with the emergent dangers of transitional terrorism in the near and long term. The Strategic Framework, among other issues, emphasized that strategizing national security policies requires greater research into and understanding of the evolving security landscape and how terrorist threats and actions could affect policy recommendations.

Paper for the Conference on "Globalization, State Capacity and Self-Determination in Muslim Contexts", organized by the Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, 2002. This paper opined that:

The legitimacy of the state is linked to its capacity to present itself as a provider of necessary public goods and more important, a neutral arbiter that guarantees the security of all sections of society. When the state is generally perceived as serving the particular interest of one group, it starts losing its legitimacy, and indeed, its authority. As state capacity declines, fear of "the other" rises and inhabitants of the state resort to other levels of solidarity, such as the religious, ethnic and regional forms, in search of security. Religious insecurity is particularly insidious and dangerous because it makes people feel threatened not just in their present lives but also in the hereafter.¹¹

The argument in this paper is that some provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and statutory provisions enacted in some states thereafter are creating serious conditions of insecurity, which need to be addressed.

Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution is a lecture presented at the Islam and Human Rights Fellow Lecture, organized by the Islam and Human Rights Project, School of Law, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, November 04, 2003. The author, Jamail A. Kamlian, is a professor of history and the Vice Chancellor for the Office of Research and Extension at Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology (MSU-IIT), Iligan City, Philippines. His project seeks to determine the implications of traditional Islamic practices and the institutionalization of the shari'a law on women's rights and gender justice amongst Muslim Filipinos in the southern Philippines. Jamail holds a Ph.D. in Philippine Studies and a Master's degree in Asian Studies from the University of the Philippines. During the lecture, Jamail asserts that the Philippines, like many of the third world countries in Southeast Asia, is now seriously confronted with problems related to their ethnic and religious minority populations. As a multi-cultural state, one of her major problems is how to forge unity and cooperation among the various ethnic groups in the country.

According to Jamail, the Bangsamoro (Muslim Filipinos) people, have been struggling for their right to self-determination. Their struggle has taken several forms ranging from parliamentary to armed struggle with a major demand of a regional political autonomy or separate a Islamic State. The Bangsamoro rebellion, popularly known as the Mindanao conflict, is a deep-rooted problem with strong historical underpinnings that can be traced as far back as the colonial era. It has persisted up to the present and may continue to persist as well as threaten the national security of the Republic of the Philippines unless appropriate solutions can be put in place and accepted by the various stakeholders of peace and development.¹²

Report of a Workshop Jointly Organized by the Centre of Excellence for National Security, (Singapore) and the Global Futures Forum International with the Support of the National Security Coordination Secretariat, (Singapore). The aim of the workshop was to look into recent violent manifestations of religious radicalization in the Southeast Asian region and beyond. During the workshop, Madam Patricia Herbold, U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, on behalf of the United States Government, hoped that all participants could, through the collective analysis of pressing global security issues, deepen their professional relationships and contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of violent radicalization as well as the means to mitigate it.

The global effects of violent radicalization, according to her, serve as a reminder that, despite differences in each state's national interest, social and political environments, there are common concerns and thus, grounds for cooperation. Commenting on the importance of cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts, Herbold also noted that one of the main goals of President Bush's National Security Strategy is to

strengthen alliances to prevent terrorist attacks and, ultimately, to defeat global terrorism.¹³

Neutralizing the Impact of Religious Conflicts
on National Security

Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age, by Thomas Quiggin, published by World Scientific Press, 2007, is a book that analyzes asymmetric threats and national security intelligence and proffers suggestions on how to address the menace of religious extremism. Thomas Quiggin is a veteran of the intelligence world and has worked in an intelligence capacity for a number of agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the International War Crimes Tribunal, the Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the UN and the Canadian Armed Forces. He is also a court qualified expert on jihadism. His area of expertise, as noted by the Court in 2005, was the “structure, organization and evolution of the global jihadist movement.”

According to Quiggin, intelligence is critical to ensuring national security, especially with asymmetric threats making up most of the new challenges. Knowledge, rather than power, is the only weapon that can prevail in a complex and uncertain environment awash with asymmetric threats, some known, many currently unknown. This book shows how such a changing national security environment has had profound implications for the strategic intelligence requirements of states in the 21st century. The book points out the fallacy underlying the age-old assumption that intelligence agencies must do a better job of connecting the dots to avoid future failures. It argues that this cannot and will not happen for a variety of reasons. Instead of seeking to predict discrete future events, the strategic intelligence community must focus rather on risk-based

anticipatory warnings concerning the nature and impact of a range of potential threats. In this respect, the book argues for a full and creative exploitation of technology to support - but not supplant - the work of the strategic intelligence community, and illustrates this ideal with reference to Singapore's path-breaking Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) program.

The Civil and Internal Conflicts Program (CICP), coordinated by Dr. Joseph Liow, has been engaged in commissioning and conducting research into internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. The CICP examines alternative methodologies and frameworks for investigating intra-state security problems plaguing Southeast Asia and focuses on holistic and long-term issues. The primary area of research for the CICP has been the conflict in southern Thailand. To emphasize the need for a good understanding of dynamics on the ground, the CICP organized a workshop in Pattani from 30-31 October 2006. Titled “*Peace Constituencies and Justice in Southern Thailand*,” the workshop brought together local and international scholars as well as local community and religious leaders to discuss the impact of conflict on local communities and to propose ways out of the impasse from a grassroots perspective.

Ethnic Nationalities and the Nigeria State: The Dynamics and Challenges of Governance in a Plural Nigeria, (2002) is a distinguished annual lecture delivered at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies by the Nigeria's former military head of state, Retired General Ibrahim Babangida. During the lecture, he argued that “while in Nigeria we have been lucky enough to avoid a major conflict between the major religious communities, the fact remains that religion and cultural diversity is enough justification to see religion and ethnicity as a potential threat.” He further stated that events within the

last half decades have shown that religious and ethnic tension has been increasing in scale and intensity. It cannot be disputed that religion and ethnicity are being manipulated to serve partisan and electoral interests.¹⁴ This interrelationship is a key to a better management strategy of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Since 1978, the Islamic law question has become a major bone of contention in Nigerian politics. It has become an important factor in which various actors in the country have been carrying out their struggles. It developed into a major struggle in 1999 when Zamfara and 11 other states also adopted the Islamic law, to include criminal law, from its initial personal law. The Christians then opposed its reintroduction and as a result several anti-Islamic law demonstrations took place in some states of the Federation, the most volatile being Kaduna and Bauchi States.

The implication of these conflicts in Nigeria, which is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural society, is that it should accept the differences among its people since it has a consensus of agreeing to live together. The full realization of democracy and federalism, adopted by the country, despite the constant threats of ethnic and religious conflicts are therefore necessary for national security.

Memorandum Submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria (2002). In this memorandum, it was opined that:

Communal and societal conflicts have emerged as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity often structured around ethnicity and religion.¹⁵

In all parts of Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming proportions. It has occurred in places like Sagamu in Ogun State, the states of Lagos, Kano, Kaduna, Nassarawa and Taraba, and many of the oil producing communities. Groups and

communities who have over the years lived together in peace and harmony now take up arms against each other in gruesome war. According to the memorandum;

The claim over scarce resources, power, land, chieftaincy, local government areas, control of markets and other trivial things have resulted in large scale killings and violence amongst groups in Nigeria. In those conflicts, a new logic of social separation has evolved in many communities in Nigeria. This is the classification of the settler and the indigene or Christian and Muslim dichotomy. Ethnicity and religion have become disintegrative and destructive social elements threatening the peace, stability and security of the country.¹⁶

Religion: The Secret Weapon in Resolving Religious-based Conflicts, by Stephen D. Hayes. Stephen operates his own consultancy company providing clients with public relations and business development advice. Until January 2005 Hayes worked as Senior Vice President of Business Development at Gannon International. In this publication, Stephen considers religion as central to most of the strife in the world today. Yet traditional diplomacy's neglect of religious factors has left the West ill-equipped to deal with the religious dimensions of conflict (as we are experiencing firsthand in Iraq).

According to him,

Nor have we the ability to counter demagogues like bin Laden or Milosevic who manipulate religion for their own purposes. He further stated that, as religious a country as the United States is, it is all-but-totally clueless when it comes to dealing with religion overseas. It is time to wake up and confront this reality before it's too late. In Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Nigeria, Indonesia, and, most visibly of course, the Middle East, religion is fueling armed conflict. At the same time, it is religion itself that holds the best hope for enhanced understanding and reconciliation. Enter the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), whose practice of faith-based diplomacy is catching the attention of leaders from the Muslim and Western worlds, including Secretary of State Colin Powell who recently declared the Center to be "doing important and worthwhile work."¹⁷

Gap in Literature

Several studies have been carried out on religious violence in Nigeria. In his study of violence in the Middle Belt Zone of Nigeria, Dunmoye argues that in the Middle Belt

Zone, most of these conflicts are based on the notion of perceived injustice by one community or group against another.¹⁸ However, he did not point out what these perceived injustices are and how they emanate from ethnic and religious factors. In his study of conflicts in the North-East Zone of Nigeria, Abubakar argued that the crises have their roots not only in the problematic ethnic and sometimes religious differences, but also the history of deprivation, marginalization and exclusion from participating in decision making processes.¹⁹ Again, he did not point out the relationship between deprivation, marginalization, exclusion and ethnic and religious crisis, as well as how they emanate from each other.

Nnoli, in his contribution to conflicts in the South-East Zone of Nigeria, has fused ethnic and religious crisis but did not draw a distinction between them.²⁰ However, he did not show how these factors are manipulated and transformed into crisis inducing agents. Bassey introduced a more academic approach to the study of conflicts in the South-South Zone of Nigeria. Although he alludes to the potency of ethnicity and religion in causing crisis, he did not situate them within the crisis continuum of the South-South Zone.²¹

This study therefore tries to fill the gap by identifying the areas not yet studied in ethnic and religious crises especially as it applies to the peculiarity of Kaduna and Borno State rather than zones in the country. This is with a view to adopting strategies that will prevent crises or resolve them quicker when they occur. This study will also highlight the long standing domination of the Northern Muslims over the Southern Christians, which has led both sides to stockpiling arms and ammunition.

¹M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?* (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), 13.

²*World Council of Churches' Conference*, Eckerd College, St. Petersburg, Florida, (February 8-12, 2002).

³Ibid.

⁴A.M. Greeley, *Religion: A Secular Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1982), 134.

⁵M. Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 105.

⁶U.K. Ogbu, *Federalism State and Religion in Nigeria*, in Isawa, JE. And Akindele, RA. (eds), *Foundation of Nigerian Federalism, 1960-1995* (Jos Institute of Governance and Social Research 1996), 282.

⁷S.M. Umar, *Islam in Nigeria: Its Concept, Manifestation and Role in Nation Building*, in Ashiwaju, G and Abubakar, Y. (eds) *Nigeria Since Independence – the First Twenty five Years* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989), 71-97.

⁸Ukiwo Ukoha, *Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria* <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=143615> (accessed 8 April 2009)

⁹O. Lanre, *Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Travails of National Integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic*, <http://www.dawodu.com/adeyemi3.htm> (accessed 28 February 2009).

¹⁰S.G. Egwu, *Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria*, Jos: African Centre for. Democratic Governance, (AFRIGOV), (2001).

¹¹*Paper for the Conference on “Globalization, State Capacity and Self Determination in Muslim Contexts*

¹²A.K. Jamail, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution*. <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=www.law.emory.edu%2Ffih%2Fworddocs%2Fjamail1.doc+&btnG=Google+Search&aq=f&oq=Philippines%2C+like+many+of+the+third+world+countries+in+Southeast+Asia%2C+is+now+seriously+confronted+with+problems+related+to+their+ethnic+and+religious+minority+populations.+> (accessed 27 February 2009).

¹³*Report of a Workshop Jointly Organized by the Centre of Excellence for National Security, (Singapore) and the Global Futures Forum International with the Support of the National Security Coordination Secretariat (Singapore)*. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/conference_reports/RSIS_GFF_Report_100708.pdf (accessed 27 February 2009).

¹⁴I.B. Babangida, *“Ethnic Nationalities and the Nigeria State: The Dynamics and Challenges of Governance in a Plural Nigeria*, being Distinguished Annual Lecture, delivered at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 2002.

¹⁵Memorandum submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria, <http://www.cdd.org.uk/cfcr/presidentialmemorandum.htm> (accessed 28 December 2008).

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷D.H. Stephen, *Religion–The Secret Weapon’ in Resolving Religious-based Conflicts*, http://www.icrd.org/storage/icrd/documents/religion_secret_weapon.pdf (accessed 27 February 2009).

¹⁸R.A. Dunmoye, *General Survey of Conflicts in the Middle Belt Zone of Nigeria*, (Africa Peace Review, Special Edition, 2003).

¹⁹D. Abubakar, “In Search of Ethnic and Cultural Identity: A General Survey of Conflicts in the North-East Zone of Nigeria, in Ibid, 35-68.

²⁰O. Nnoli, *General Survey of Conflicts in the South-East Zone of Nigeria*, in Ibid. 69-90.

²¹C. Bassey, *General Survey of Conflict in the South-South Zone of Nigeria*, in Ibid, 111-128.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter one of this thesis was an introductory chapter, which covers the general background of religious-based violence in Nigeria. The chapter highlighted the factors believed to be responsible for the country's protracted and, what one may consider, an interminable violence. The chapter also defined some of the key concepts used in this research in order to give the readers a clear and thorough understanding of the subject matter.

Chapter two reviews and discusses available relevant literature written in relation to the key research questions of this thesis. These are the relationship between religion and violence; factors responsible for religious-based violence in Nigeria; religious-based violence and national security; and neutralizing the impact of religious conflicts on national security. Discussions on these concepts become essential for better understanding of religious violence as a global phenomenon.

Subsequently, chapter three intends to explain how the sources, underscored in the preceding chapter, were used to develop variables that appear to be responsible for the protracted religious violence in Nigeria. It will also outline the methodology employed during the course of the research. Furthermore, the chapter will highlight how the data used in the research was generated and analyzed. Subsequently, it will explain the case studies used in this research, and the underlying principle behind their selection.

The Problem Statement

The religious crises in various parts of Nigeria have continued to pose serious threats to its national security. Apart from recording heavy losses of lives, destruction of property and displacement of citizens, the problem becomes complicated as regards the choice of targets and the types of weapons deployed during these crises.¹ The use of weapons during crises “encourages reprisal killings, which spark off new rounds of violence between warring groups.”² This situation inhibits the ability of security agencies to deescalate crises quickly and restore law and order. Thus, there is a tendency for the crises to escalate and become prolonged. Some of the most recent manifestations of religious-based violence in Nigeria were the crises in Kaduna State and the attacks that were unleashed in Borno state by groups referred to as Taliban.

Research Design

Detailed and accurate analysis is very crucial to any research work. For the purpose of this research, it was necessary for the researcher to use certain parameters for analysis based on the relevance of those parameters to the study. Effort was also exerted on conceptualizing the various aspects of the thesis in order to enhance the understanding of the issues that were raised in the course of the research. Variables in the subject matter were also scrutinized with a view to identifying any possible causal relationships.

Sources of Data

During the course of this study, the researcher was unable to obtain data from any primary source. The researcher was also not able to interview the key individuals and government officials who would have been very helpful during the course of this

research. This is because of the proximity of the researcher to those sources. Again, telephone calls and emails were not possible due to the unwillingness of most of the stake-holders to respond to questions via such means. Also, other government agencies and ministries could not be visited for information hence; the bulk of the data that were used for the study were mainly secondary ones, which were obtained from reports, books, journals, newspapers, publications by both governmental and non-governmental organizations and from the Internet in order to enhance the validity of the findings of the study. Unpublished materials were also used. The collected data were then analyzed, qualitatively and critically, in order to arrive at a synthesis presentation and make valuable deductions, which in turn lead to conclusions that will facilitate recommendations to prevent the escalation of future religious violence in Nigeria.

Method of Data Analysis

The method of analysis employed in course of this study is a qualitative one based on case studies. Deductions were then made, which led to the findings of this study. A case study analysis is chosen because it affords a comprehensive and an all-inclusive data collection from multiple sources of information that are rich in context and substance.³ Unlike other methods, a case study examines the relationship of all variables in order to provide as complete understanding of a situation as possible.

Also, unlike quantitative methods of research, like the survey, which focus on the questions of who, what, where, how much, and how many, and archival analysis, which often situates the participant in some form of historical context, case studies are the preferred strategy when how or why questions are asked.⁴ Likewise, they are the preferred method when the researcher has little control over the events, and when there is

a contemporary focus within a real life context. In addition, unlike more specifically directed experiments, case studies require a problem that seeks a holistic understanding of the event or situation in question using inductive logic--reasoning from specific to more general terms.⁵ The best way to explain an issue such as religious violence is to apply a qualitative case study method of analysis.

Methods of Data Collection

In the course of this project, data will be collected mainly through academic research of literature publically available in libraries and on the internet. Viewpoints were also sought from individuals both within and outside the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Selection of Research Case Studies

For the purpose of this research, two states from different geographical regions of the country were chosen as case studies, for better understanding of the nature and seriousness of religious violence in Nigeria. These states are Kaduna and Borno States. First, Kaduna, as a case study, becomes suitable because of its cosmopolitan nature. Kaduna is situated at the heart of the country. It is the second largest state in the northern Nigeria with an equal population of Christians and Muslims, which makes it very sensitive when it comes to matters that are religious in nature. Any misunderstanding between the two religions is likely to spread fast to other parts of the country and therefore degenerate to a more catastrophic situation in terms of loss of lives and property. It is also likely to be predisposed to other forms of violence and conflicts.

Therefore, conducting research on the causes of ethno-religious conflicts that have particularly become endemic in Kaduna State is done with a view to finding solutions to them. This will greatly help in addressing similar problems elsewhere in the country. There have been many crises in Kaduna State, but for better analysis, 4 major ones will be considered. These crises were selected for discussion because among others, they assumed more serious dimensions both in their intensity and casualty tolls. Also, they were chosen out of several others due to their nature and impact on the community in particular and the State in general. This is in an attempt to determine correlation and disparities between them, so that a more realistic hypothesis could be arrived at. The violence examined is the Zangon-Kataf Violence of 1992; the Kaduna City Violence of 21 February 2000, and the Gwantu Violence of 2001.

Secondly, Borno State was deemed appropriate by the researcher to be used as a case study on the topic of religious violence because the state is bordered to the East by Chad Republic, which is also a conflict and crises ravaged country, and to the South-East by Cameroon, which is until recently was Nigeria's adversary. So therefore, there is every tendency for crises to be sponsored or fueled from the neighboring countries. Also, any crisis in Borno State can easily spill over to those neighboring countries. Particularly, the Taliban activities in the state are considered appropriate for analysis because of the alleged linkage between the group and the Taliban, a religious extremist group in Afghanistan.

Selection, Explanation and Rating of Variables Against the Selected Violence

In order for the Nigerian government to effectively deal with the menace of religious violence in the country, it is indispensable to identify what its characteristic causes really are and the indicators that signify the emergence of that violence. It is only when the problem is known or anticipated that it can be effectively confronted head-on to tackle it. It is the duty of government to ensure law and order, not only by arresting disorder, but above all by taking steps in time to prevent it breaking out.⁶ During the course of the research, these causes were identified based on various authors having similar opinions on a particular factor. Therefore, the first step the researcher took to develop his hypothesis was to examine the available materials on the causes of religious violence in Nigeria.

There are a variety of characteristics associated with a religious crisis situation. A religious crisis is often a turning point in an unfolding sequence of events or actions. It is a situation in which the requirement for action is high in the minds and planning of participants. It is followed by an important outcome whose consequences and effects will shape the future of parties to the religious crisis. A religious crisis is a convergence of events whose combination produces a new set of circumstance. It is a situation in which control over events and their effects decreases. It is a period in which uncertainties about the assessment of the situation and activities for dealing with it increases.⁷

One of the major problems facing Nigeria is the continual series of ethnic and religious conflicts whose roots, until now, have not been completely traced. A critical look at this dilemma makes one realize the complicated nature of the problem that has claimed so many lives. This section will give a closer look at some of the key factors that

are responsible for religious violence in Nigeria. From the study so far, the following factors were identified. These include but are not limited to: poverty occasioned by unemployment; religious intolerance and attachment of ethnicity to religion. Other causes include deprivation, marginalization and dominance; illiteracy and ignorance; Shari'a penal code and external influence.

Poverty Occasioned by Unemployment

A man willing to work, and unable to find work, is perhaps the saddest sight that fortune's inequality exhibits under this sun.⁸

Thomas Carlyle

Poverty may be regarded as the shortage of basic necessities of livelihood such as food, clothing, shelter and safe drinking water, all of which determine our quality of life. It may also include the lack of access to social amenities like education and employment, which help prevent us from poverty and allow one to enjoy the respect of being a citizen. It is generally believed that poverty is the product of unemployment. In Nigeria, a majority of the violent conflicts are occasioned by the abject poverty and or unemployment. There is a tendency for those portions of an economy that are trapped into poverty or are jobless to be more inclined to violence. Furthermore, those unemployed are the same people that eventually become sources for some groups and individuals to recruit as perpetrators of different violent activities.

In an interview with Alhaji Aminu Garba Sidi, chairman of Bauchi-based non-governmental organization (NGO), Christian-Muslim Peace Movement (CMPM), he identifies idleness as what breeds rumor-mongering, hate, and fanaticism, saying these are the major cause of religious and ethnic conflicts in the society.⁹ He further opined that joblessness is one of the factors that contribute to crisis in the state because, as the saying

goes, an idle mind is the devil's workshop.¹⁰ There is the general feeling among the youth, and of the people in general, that the government is very insensitive to their educational wellbeing. From primary school through tertiary institutions, graduates are not gainfully employed. Thus, they add to the army of unemployed in the society. Also, the high rate of dropouts and an increased number of parents who simply do not bother to send their children to school at all, compound the problem of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria. This will be further explained in chapter four.

The moderation of this variable as shown in the table below will be based on whether the variable is present or not, in each of the crisis situations being studied. If the degree of presence of this factor is high, 'Present' will be awarded, and if the factor exists in an inconsiderable measure or does not exist at all, it will be considered as 'Absent'.

Religious Intolerance

A man who is convinced of the truth of his religion is indeed never tolerant. At the least, he is to feel pity for the adherent of another religion but usually it does not stop there. The faithful adherent of a religion will try first of all to convince those that believe in another religion and usually he goes on to hatred if he is not successful. However, hatred then leads to persecution when the might of the majority is behind it.¹¹

Albert Einstein

As can be seen in the above quotation, religious intolerance is yet another factor responsible for religious violence in Nigeria. The ability of the different religions and their adherents to tolerate each other and respect each other's right to worship as they see fit is the first step towards solving the problems of religious violence in the country.

In the last two decades Nigeria experienced events of tensions, violence and killings between Christians and Muslims. It is not unconnected with the complex nature of their interreligious and intercultural relationships, which have been that of religious fundamentalism and religious riots. This is partly because of either lack of understanding or misinterpretation of each other's religious faith.¹²

Furthermore, added to this, is the fact that the dominant model of religious learning ordered by major Nigerian religions has been faith oriented and overwhelmed by religious indoctrination and dogma. Religious education was used to get people to embrace Christianity or Islam, rather, than being a process or formation for religious tolerance and dialogue. Consequently,

most children and youth are educated within this framework and thus inclined to a blind faith. Religious intolerance is thus, to a great extent, the outcome of the way in which religious education is taught. It is therefore not surprising when we see children growing up very intolerant, exclusive, with lack of openness to dialogue.¹³

“Religious intolerance is a major cause of most religious violence in Nigeria’s educational institutions today. This is largely due the type of orientation, impression and teachings given to the students both in the schools and at their various homes.”¹⁴ The February 2003 clash between Muslim and Christian students in some secondary schools in Oyo State, Nigeria over the wearing of the hijab (veil) by female students is an example of religious intolerance in Nigeria. Hence, the two major religions in Nigeria (Christianity and Islam) have maintained their dominant influence on both the society and schools, allowing neither the room for dialogue, respect for religious diversity, interreligious learning, nor co-existence and collaboration.¹⁵

In moderating and scoring this variable, the researcher considered its presence in each of the violent situations selected. If it is reasonably believed to be the main cause of a particular crisis, ‘Present’ will be scored under that variable, but if its presence is insignificant or if the variable is not applicable to the situation, ‘Absent’ will be awarded against the variable.

Attachment of Ethnicity to Religion

Ethnicity is routinely identified as a prominent factor in armed conflicts. Significantly, it is present as a political factor in more than half of conflicts in Africa from the 1990s.¹⁶ Ethno-political competition for control of the state has been brought about mostly due to their pursuit for superiority. These are generally known as identity conflicts. They emerge with intensity when a community loses confidence in mainstream political institutions and processes. They could also result from unmet basic needs for social and economic security, and a resolve to struggle for political recognition as a people. Again, the imbalance in sizes and population of ethnic groups within geo-political grouping gives rise to these conflicts.

The history of the world has been in great part the history of the mixing of peoples. Modern communication and transport accelerate mass migrations from one continent to another. Ethnic and racial diversity is more than ever a salient fact of the age. But what happens when people of different origins, speaking different languages and professing different religions, inhabit the same locality and live under the same political sovereignty? Ethnic and racial conflict far more than ideological conflict is the explosive problem of our times.¹⁷

Most of the religious conflicts which have occurred in Nigeria had ethnic connotations. This is largely due to the multiethnic nature of the country. In Nigeria, various ethnic groupings are inclined towards a particular religion making issues that are originally ethnic in nature to transform into religious matters. Let's take the two major ethnic groups in Nigeria as an example; the Hausa-Fulani in the north and the Igbo in the southern part of the country. The Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslims and the Igbo are predominantly Christians. So therefore one should expect that any conflict between these two ethnic groups to be called a religious conflict. It is just a matter of the intertwining nature of these two factors (religion and ethnicity).

The ranking of this particular variable is done in accordance with its relevance on each of the cases examined. Emphasis will be placed on whether a particular case is consequent upon a combination of religion and ethnicity or, it may be that it started as a result of one and transform into the other. If this situation exists, 'Present' will be recorded against the variable. Also, consideration is given to a situation where religion shapes or changes what could be originally termed to be ethnic, as is the case in most of the violence in Nigeria. If on the other hand, the variable is not applicable to the situation, 'Absent' will be recorded.

Deprivation, Marginalization and Dominance

If we were really tough on crime, we'd try to save our children from the desperation and deprivation that leave them primed for a life of crime.¹⁸

Carrie P. Meek

Another factor that causes conflicts between the two major religious groups (Islam and Christianity), not only in Nigeria but in the world over, is the perceived marginalization and deprivation of one group by the other. The above quotation has shown that deprivation is a contributing factor in the commission of crimes. Most of the time, when one feels sidelined and denied something, he or she believes to be his or her entitlement, it is usually normal for that person to stand up and fight for his or her right. In Nigeria, a number of violent religious conflicts occurred due to this reason.

Let us look at the circumstances surrounding most of the violent conflicts in Kaduna State and the Middle-Belt region of Nigeria as an example. Large numbers of conflicts in those regions were caused by seeming marginalization, deprivation and perceived domination by the majority Hausa-Fulani against the minority ethnic groups.

For instance, The Zangon-Kataf violence in Kaduna State, which erupted on 15 May 1992, had antecedents of a long standing feud over the domination by the majority Zango Hausa-Fulani over the minority Katafs who are the original indigenes of the area. The Katafs always show antipathy towards the imposition of the Hausa-Fulani district heads in Zangon-Kataf by the Zazzau Emirate Council. The complaints of indiscriminate tax consideration, perceived injustice at the Magistrate Courts concerning cases that involved indigenes, and lack of access to educational opportunities by the indigenes, in most instances, culminated into violent clashes, all due to the perceived authoritarian policies of the Hausa-Fulani controlled administration. This is also the case in the Middle-Belt region.

In rating this variable, effort will be exerted on examining whether the violence is as a result of domination of one religious group by the other, or as a result of one group feeling marginalized or deprived. This is normally the case when there is a political interest or quest for economic resources. ‘Present’ or ‘Absent’ will be scored if the variable is applicable or irrelevant to the discussed violent situation respectively.

Illiteracy and Ignorance

History shows that there is nothing so easy to enslave and nothing so hard to emancipate as ignorance, hence it becomes the double enemy of civilization. By its servility it is the prey of tyranny, and by its credulity it is the foe of enlightenment.¹⁹

Lemuel K. Washburn

Ignorance occasioned by low level of education is a negative element in a society. Illiteracy and ignorance are a causative factor in the Nigeria’s continual religious narrow-mindedness that causes major religious violence in the country. Most of our religious

leaders are not helping matters. What they usually do is to send a wrong message across to their adherents based on theological ignorance, and because most of them (the adherents) are uneducated, they tend to act without understanding the truth. If the few available Islamic institutions are diligently utilized, leaders who wish to manipulate the religion to their own gains will find it very difficult to do so.

Capitalizing on the lack of knowledge of most of their followers, these religious leaders, and at times, some overzealous politicians, are availed with the opportunity to recruit a large number of youth with whom they can easily foment violence to satisfy their selfish agendas. This thought is supported by what a United States-based Nigerian journalist and motivational speaker, Mr. Tony Oyatedor, said. According to him, “Nigeria is facing a religious crisis today because of lack of knowledge. When a man understands the Holy Koran and the Holy Bible very well, he would neither burn a church or a mosque. He would rather know that the two edifices (the church and the mosque) are built mainly to pray to only one God.”²⁰

Emphasis on scoring this variable will be based on whether the considered violence occurred as a result of religious ignorance on the part of the perpetrators. This will be assessed by the level of involvement of the learned people within the affected domain. ‘Present’ will be awarded to the situation that is believed to be caused by lack of knowledge and or understanding of the contending issues. Literacy level of the affected area will also be examined, to score this variable.

Shari’a Penal Code

Shari’a has always been a source of conflict between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. As Islam was being introduced into northern Nigeria in the 14th century,

Muslims applied the Islamic Shari 'a Law to their everyday lifestyle. The ascendancy of Shari'a lasted in Nigeria until the advent of the British rule,²¹ which seriously disrupted its implementation. The Shari'a courts, though maintained, were under the supervision of the colonial masters. In line with colonial policy, the British established a Muslim court of appeal in 1956, which was empowered to deal with matters of Muslim personal law only. This court was renamed the Shari'a court of appeal just before independence in 1960.²² This action is the origin of the recent Shari'a contestation in northern Nigeria.

Ever since Nigeria became independent in 1960, Muslims have voiced their demand for the indispensability and supremacy of Shari'a law. Christians, on the other hand, have expressed their fear that introducing Shari'a will undermine freedom of conscience, speech and other civil rights, and bring about total stagnation. There is also concern for the gradual death of the Christian ministry. The Shari'a debate has recently shifted its ground significantly since 1999, when most of the northern states adopted Shari'a law, extending its reach to the area of criminal law. Technically, the new Islamic penal codes apply only to Muslims. Since the implementation of Shari'a by Zamfara state in 2000, eleven other states in the northern part of Nigeria have followed suit. Since then, a number of religious conflicts had taken place, especially in the north. However, in most cases, whenever there is any violence between Muslims and Christians in the north, there has been always a reprisal in the southern and eastern part of the country, where Christians are the majority. A score of 'Present' will be assigned to the crisis that is most caused by this factor. 'Absent' will be scored against the crisis that is not caused by the factor.

External Influence

External influence, in this thesis is considered an important factor that contributes to the emergence and escalation of violent crises, the world over. It is considered as that force outside of one's self that tends to take over his behavior and eventually have an overriding influence in the way and manner that person and or organization acts or conducts his or its actions respectively. External influence can be of different forms or ways. It can be in terms of ideology, funding, environment and a lot of other factors. In Nigeria, external influence has led to a lot of violent crises. Notable amongst them is the activities of the Nigerian Taliban in Borno State.

Crises involving Muslim populations in Europe are often blamed on influences from 'foreign' Islam, with blame most often assigned to two types of external phenomena. First is what has been called 'consular' Islam. During the 1970s and 1980s, the first Muslim immigrants to Europe (mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Turkey) effectively organized worship, mosques finances, imam activities, and Koranic teaching through their countries' consulates. The consulates were intent on diffusing Muslim protests or crises in Europe carried out in the name of Islam.²³ More recently a second transnational phenomenon, or 'foreign' Islamic movement, has begun to compete for control over Muslims in Europe. These include the Tabligh from Pakistan, the Salafi movement from Saudi Arabia, and the Muslim Brotherhood organized by Islamist elite in exile from Middle Eastern and North African countries.²⁴

Emphasis on scoring this factor will be based on the relationship between the crisis situation or the belligerents and external body if any. The level of the influence if any, will determine what to be scored against the variable. Again, susceptibility of a

group being controlled by a foreign ideology and methods will also be considered to be an external influence. It may simply be financial support or any other form of assistance. A score of 'Present' is given to the crisis that is considered to be the most externally influenced. Table 1 below shows clearly how the identified variables will be scored against the chosen case studies. It also shows the scoring criteria that will be used in the next chapter.

Finally, this chapter has explained the methodology that the researcher adopted during the course of this thesis. The chapter also shows how data was sourced, collated analyzed and synthesized to produce a seemingly logical analysis of the original thesis statement. Chapter four will, therefore, be a follow-up to this. It will analyze in detail the chosen case studies with a view to making recommendations on how the government of Nigeria can effectively prevent or curtail religious violence when they occurred .

Table 1. Sample Table for Scoring Variable Against the Chosen Case Studies

		CASE STUDIES						
		KADUNA			BORNO			
Serial	VARIABLES	Zangon-Kataf Crisis	Kaduna Crisis	Gwantu Crisis	Taliban Activities	Number of A and P		
		Present = 'P' and Abcent = 'A' (APPLICABILITY)						
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)		
						A	P	
1.	Poverty Occasioned by Unemployment							
2.	Religious Intolerance							
3.	Attachment of Ethnicity to Religion							
4.	Deprivation, Marginalization and Dominance							
5.	Illiteracy/Ignorance							
6.	Sharia Penal Code							
7.	External Influence							

Source: Created by Author

¹Dalhatu Ja'afar, Investigation Panel Report on Kaduna Religious Crises of February and May 2000, 8.

²Report of National Workshop on Ethnic Militias, Democracy and National Security (National War College, Abuja), 2006, 5.

³J. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), 61.

⁴Case Studies, <http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/casestudy/com2a1.cfm> (accessed 15 February 2009).

⁵Ibid.

⁶Archbishop John Onaiyekan, Vice President of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria (29 February 2000).

⁷Vasudev, D.A.S. Resolving Religious Crisis for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria, Institute for Applied Spiritual Technology, Ibadan, Nigeria, http://www.cesnur.org/2006/sd_das.htm (accessed 14 March 2009).

⁸C. Thomas, Quotations and Famous Quotes of Thomas Carlyle, <http://en.proverbia.net/citasautor.asp?autor=11324&page=3> (accessed 17 March 2009).

⁹Joblessness: Causes Religious Crises, <http://www.tellmeonline.net/tag/violence-in-nigeria/> (accessed 14 March 2009).

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹E. Albert, Quotations of Religious Intolerance, http://www.religious-tolerance.org/quot_intol.htm (accessed 17 March 2009).

¹²Pollefeyt, D. Religious (In) Tolerance and Religious Education in Nigeria: A Call for a Paradigm Shift, <http://www.kuleuven.be/research/researchdatabase/project/3H07/3H070660.htm> (accessed 14 March 2009).

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶C. Spolar, "Ethnicity in African Conflicts," *Washington Post* (12 March 1997), 40.

¹⁷S. Arthur, The Cult of Ethnicity, Good and Bad, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,973355,00.html> (accessed 14 March 2009).

¹⁸P.M. Carrie, Brainy Quotes, <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/carriepme396175.html> (accessed 17 March 2009).

¹⁹K. W. Lemuel, *Is The Bible Worth Reading? And Other Essays* (1911), <http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/quotes/washburn.htm> (accessed 16 March 2009).

²⁰Tony Oyatedor, *How to stop violence, religious crises in Nigeria* <http://news.onlinenigeria.com/templates/?a=859&z=12> (accessed 8 April 2009).

²¹A.R.I. Doi, *Islam in Nigeria* (Zaria, Nigeria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964), 210.

²²G. Basri, *Nigeria and Sharia: Aspirations and Apprehensions* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundations, 1994), 41-42.

²³Between Suicide Bombing and the Burning Banlieues: The Multiple Crises of Europe's Parallel Societies, http://aei.pitt.edu/6757/01/1350_22.pdf (accessed 9 April 2009).

²⁴*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS-BASED VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: CASE STUDIES OF KADUNA AND BORNO STATES

Having discussed the origin of conflict in Nigeria and explaining the various concepts that are important to this thesis in chapter one, and having going into the relevant literature written by various authors, scholars and or organizations on subjects and topics which are related to this research work, it is now appropriate to analyze religious-based violence in Nigeria via four case studies. This chapter will therefore analyze in detail, the ethnic and religious violence in Kaduna State and Taliban activities in Borno State; their causes; nature; impact and precipitating causes that should have been indicators to the government, that religious violence was about to take place.

A Case Study of Kaduna State Ethno-Religious Violence

General Background

As mentioned earlier in chapter three, there have been many crises in Kaduna State; but 4 major ones will be considered. They were selected because among others, they assumed more serious dimensions both in their intensity and casualty tolls. This segment is divided into 2 parts. The first part focuses on the causes, nature, and toll resulting from the crises respectively, while the second part deals with the impact of the crises on Kaduna State and Nigeria in general. The crises examined within this case study are the Zangon-Kataf Violence of 1992; the Kaduna City Violence of 21February 2000, and the Gwantu Violence of 2001. These major conflicts were chosen out of several

others due to their nature and impact on the community in particular and the State in general.

A Survey of Kaduna State

Kaduna State is one of the 36 States of Nigeria, with Kaduna as its capital. It lies in the North-West geo-political zone of Nigeria and has a population of about 3,935,618 people. It comprises of 3 senatorial zones namely: Kaduna; Kafanchan and Zaria, and is made up of 23 local government areas. It shares boundaries with Kano and Katsina States in the North, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and Niger State in the South, Plateau and Nassarawa States in the East, with Kebbi and Zamfara States in the West. It is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious State with almost an equal population of Muslims and Christians living side by side. It is the political nerve centre of Northern Nigeria.

The multi-ethnic nature of Kaduna State is ascribed to the many tribal groups that exist within it. Examples of these are: Hausa/Fulani; Jaba; Gbagyi; Kataf; Kagoro; Moro'a; Ninzom; Koro; Bajju; Ikulu and many others. All these different groupings have their own unique culture, traditional, beliefs and morals. These divergences in religion, culture and values of the various ethnic groups also contribute to the raging ethno-religious violence in the state. Kaduna has the unenviable record of having witnessed the most destructive crises in both lives and property in the history of Nigeria since the end of the civil war in the late 1960s.

Since the early 1960s, the political leadership of Kaduna State has been in the hands of the Northern Muslims to the disaffection of the Southern Christians. This situation has caused much tension and at times escalated to serious violence. From the above, it can be deduced that the multi-ethnic nature of Kaduna State and the political

rivalry between the Muslims and the Christians makes the State susceptible to violence and conflicts, which up till now, still hunts the state.

The Zangon-Kataf Violence of May 1992

The dispute between the Hausa and the Kataf people goes beyond the quarrel over the site of their market. Between them, there has been a protracted misunderstanding over land ownership. The Kataf claim the land, which the Hausas live on, was theirs, and that the Hausas were only settlers. These struggles have continued in various forms resulting into very bloody clashes in Zango-Kataf, in 1992.¹ The violence, which erupted on 15 May 1992, had antecedents of a long standing feud over the perceived domination of the majority Katafs, who claimed to be the original settlers of the area, by the minority Zango Hausa-Fulani.

The Katafs always show antipathy towards the way they were systematically treated by the Hausa-Fulani district heads in the Emirate Council. The complaints of indiscriminate tax consideration, perceived injustice at the Magistrate Courts concerning cases that involved indigenes, and lack of access to other opportunities by the indigenes, in most instances culminated into violent clashes between the two rivals. Accordingly, the May 1992 clash was an expression of the Katafs' frustration against the Emirate Council and the Hausas, whom they viewed as obstacle to their most dear quest for self determination and reliance. It would appear that the oppressive tendencies and activities of the Hausa-Fulani, for over the five decades since they came to settle in Zangon-Kataf, have led to the continued agitations and reactions from the Katafs in a bid to attain autonomy.

However, the immediate cause of the violence of May 1992 was a disagreement between the Hausa-Fulani and the Katafs over where the Zango Traditional Market should be. In the ensuing battle, in which over 1,000 people were believed to have died, mosques and churches were the prime targets.² The communal clash, subsequently took a religious dimension, when the bodies of the killed Hausa men were brought to Kaduna from the crisis area, which incited Muslims communities within and outside the state. This action led to a serious violence in Tudun-Wada area, Kaduna, where Christians were terribly dealt with. In reaction, Christians in Sabon-Tasha, Kaduna, where the Christian population is high, retaliated by attacking the Muslims. The crisis therefore turned out eventually to be Muslim-Christian violence.

The Zangon-Kataf conflict was seen more as ethnic conflict than religious. Certain factors, however, suggest that the conflict was more religious than ethnic. For instance, the unpublished report of the Justice Rahila Cudjoe Commission of inquiry that investigated the unfortunate conflict showed very clearly that among the casualties were members of ethnic groups that professed different faiths.

The Zangon-Kataf crisis was quite devastating leading to the death of more than a thousand people and property worth millions of Naira destroyed.³ Over 500 people from both sides were displaced from their homes causing them to flee to neighboring States.⁴ The crisis stalled the economic and social life of the community. There was evidence that both the Hausa-Fulani and the Katafs used dangerous weapons during the crisis.⁵ Considering the nature and reason behind this violence, one may wonder how the situation, which could have been handled more maturely, was allowed to deteriorate to

the level it did. This is believed to be as a result of the selfish interests and personal agendas of some political and religious leaders who sought prominence in the society.

Also, from the caliber of the weapons employed during the crisis, it was alleged but later confirmed that the Kataf faction called in their ex-military men to execute the attack. This was evident by the report of the tribunal set up by the Federal Government to investigate the crisis. At the end of its sittings, the tribunal sentenced 17 persons to death by hanging for complicity in the killings.⁶ Among those sentenced to death was a former military governor of Rivers State, Major-General Zamani Lekwot, of the Kataf tribe. However, the government later reviewed the case and commuted the sentence to various terms of imprisonment.⁷ It was also suspected that the Hausa people had access to heavy weapons, which were brought in by their sympathizers from the nearby villages. The detailed toll of the crisis as recorded by the Police and the State Security Service (SSS) included; over a thousand people were killed; 5 houses and business premises and hotels destroyed; 7 churches and 2 mosques burnt; 8 vehicles destroyed; 2 policemen killed; 15 civilians and policemen wounded; and 500 people displaced.⁸

Scoring of Variables

Having described and critically analyzed the Zangon-Kataf violence of May 1992, it is now clear and more certain as to what factors precipitated it and further aggravated it. It is therefore appropriate to score the violence against the variables identified in the preceding chapter. Based on the personal experience and witness of the researcher, poverty occasioned by unemployment was believed to have aggravated the violence of Zangon-kataf to an extent. This is because most of the destruction that took place, especially within Kaduna metropolis, was carried out by the unemployed, often referred

to as 'Area Boys'. These are people who anxiously await any opportunity to seize and cause destruction and looting of shops and other public property. Though in this particular violence, this factor is not the ultimate cause even though its presence fueled the follow-off destruction considerably. Hence, it will be considered 'Absent'.

Religious intolerance is believed to be 'present' in the Zangon Kataf violence of 1992. This could be seen from the way minor issues that could have been averted, degenerated to what later became an uncontrollable situation. However, judging from how the situation degenerated as the violence unfolded, an ethno-religious factor began to manifest itself more clearly. This could be seen from the wanton destruction that followed. From the number of mosques and churches destroyed, the crisis that later followed within Kaduna and neighboring states and villages, and from the investigation and verdict of the tribunal convened to preside over the issue, it is very obvious that ethno-religious factors assumed the center stage during that violence. Also, at the start of the violence in Zangon Kataf, before it spread outside the town, it was basically a Hausa-Fulani-Kataf affair. Furthermore, when the violence eventually escalated, it was seen that no Muslim or Christian fought on the opposite side. Therefore, the factors of attachment of ethnicity to religion will be regarded as being 'Present' in the situation. This is because, it was not the real cause of the violence but it contributed in shaping it to the extent it attained.

Based on the analysis above, it is clear that the violence had its background traced to a long standing discontent and mistrust that existed between the two ethnic groups. Therefore, it is safe to say that, the variable, 'perceived deprivation, marginalization and dominance' were critical to the occurrence of the violence. Therefore, these variables are considered 'Present' during the violence.

As mentioned earlier, ignorance and illiteracy are factors that have negatively impacted the Zangon Kataf violence. Lack of thorough knowledge of the Holy Qur'an and the Holy Bible was what made both adherents resort to attacking each other, to the extent of burning Mosques and Churches. Hence, it is considered 'Present'. Shari'a penal code was never an issue in this crisis and therefore was not a contributing factor. Hence it is considered 'Absent'.

Furthermore, even though no external influence was confirmed to be present in the Zangon-Kataf violence, there was evidence that there were some external manipulations from the neighboring states and villages during the crisis. This was evidenced by the sophistication of weapons employed during the crisis. It was confirmed that during the crisis, nontraditional weapons were used by both sides. But because nobody was arrested in connection to that, even though there was an indication that it happened, it is also considered 'Absent'.

The Kaduna City Violence of 21 February 2000

Tension of a possible religious crisis in Kaduna State started building up when the Shari'a Bill was sent to the State House of Assembly in January 2000 by the State Government and a Committee set up to look at the desirability or otherwise of practicing Shari'a law in the state.⁹

The bill was greeted with a lot of debate from all sectors either in support or against its implementation. The tension came to a climax when Christians observed that Muslims were conducting solidarity rallies in support of the proposed Shari'a Bill in different parts of the State. The Christians, who had generally opposed the passage of the bill at different debates, decided to carry out a peaceful demonstration on 21 February 2000 at

the State House of Assembly and Government House to register their objection and dissatisfaction over the bill and implementation of Shari'a in the State.

Christian protesters mobilized in their thousands from various parts of the metropolis and neighboring villages and moved amass to Kaduna State House of Assembly through the major highways all carrying leaves and placards in their hands expressing their disapproval of the bill. Some of the inscription on their placards reads we don't want Shari' a.¹⁰

In response to their letter, the Clerk advised them to be peaceful and law abiding. They moved from the House of Assembly to the Government House where a similar letter was submitted to the Acting Governor of the State, Engineer, Stephen Shekari, as the Governor of the State, Alhaji Ahmed Makarfi, was out of the country. The Acting Governor received the leaders and their petition after which he informed them that their petition would be given speedy attention by the State Government. The protesters left the Government House peacefully at about 0945 hours under close police monitoring and surveillance.

From the Government House, the protesters, whose number had increased astronomically, went in various directions, in an attempt to go back to their various destinations.

However, violence erupted when the Christian protesters were stoned by Muslim youths that frowned at their actions. Spontaneously, the situation assumed a violent dimension and spread throughout Kaduna metropolis. The hitherto peaceful demonstrators became hostile and uncontrollable. This incidence was not expected to result into immediate crisis, as the demonstrators were monitored by police escort of about 100 Mobile policemen.¹¹

The procession later degenerated into violence due to inbuilt grievances which had existed over the decades, and the Mobile Policemen had to use tear-gas and other riot control agents to disperse them and restore normalcy.

Some reports in the print-media propagated a report that about 1000 Christians might have been killed and a lot of Muslim houses were destroyed during the crisis. These speculations by the media contributed greatly to the reprisal attacks that followed from both sides.¹²

The detailed toll of the crisis however, include: 350 people killed; 400 houses, business premises and hotels destroyed; 245 vehicles destroyed; 75 churches and 28 mosques burnt; 4 policemen killed and 3 wounded; 100 civilians wounded and over 5,000 people displaced from their homes.¹³

In Kaduna State, the Hausa-Fulani have dominated the political system of the State and imposed the emirate system, based on Islamic religious principles, on the Christians. This has been strongly resisted by the Southern Kaduna people and their leadership because it is not in conformity with their culture. The people of Southern Kaduna believed that they are discriminated against by the Hausa-Fulani in all spheres of the public service and even in private interactions. Kaduna metropolis was generally affected by the crisis. In particular, the areas worst hit were Ahmadu Bello Way, Kawo, Tudun Wada, Rigasa, Sabon-Tasha, Kakuri, Narayi, Unguwan-Rimi, Malali, Kabala Doki, Constitution Road and Sabon Gari. Other areas outside Kaduna Metropolis that were affected include Kachia, Kajuru, Birnin-Gwari and Zaria.

From the level of devastation and the death toll recorded during the violence, it clearly shows the amount and caliber of nontraditional weapons, such as automatic rifles, that must have been employed during the crisis. There was also a lack of quick response to early warning signs and proper enforcement of laws on illegal firearms by the police due to negligence and lack of commitment to their responsibilities. It also shows the negative role the media can play to escalate crisis, as such reports caused the reprisal attacks. It is therefore necessary to look at those possible problem areas in future crises.

Scoring of Variables

From the analysis above, it is now clear as to what caused the Kaduna Crisis of 2000. Its elements, causes, and characteristics are now better understood. Thus, it is easier to assess the violence and score it against the variables identified in Chapter 3 above. First, Poverty occasioned by unemployment, though not a cause per se, it did play a role in aggravating the violence. The level of destruction attained during the violence, to a greater extent, was aided by the action of the looters. This judgment is based on the researcher's personal experience and involvement in the Internal Security Operation conducted by the military when the problem occurred. Most of the destruction, especially in the business areas, was perpetrated by those engulfed by poverty and those who are unemployed. This factor, as seen during the Kaduna violence, played a role in the destruction hence, it is considered 'Present'.

Furthermore, 'Absent' is considered suitable while assessing the violence as regards to attachment of ethnicity to religious as an element. This is because, the crisis, from all indications, had nothing to do with ethnicity. It was basically a religious thing, as could be observed from the killings and destruction that was carried out. Instead, it is more appropriate to tag the violence as being caused by religious intolerance. This is because both parties, during the violence, did not show maturity and tolerance in handling the situation. Though, there were a lot of complacencies and laxities on the part of the police, the circumstances surrounding the escalation of the violence have demonstrated a lack of tolerance on the part of both sides. The actions of both the Muslim and Christian youths left much to be desired. Therefore, religious intolerance is considered 'Present'. Also, the researcher has not been able to connect deprivation,

marginalization and dominance as a factor, to the violence of 2000. There was nothing so concrete that will derive that assumption, hence this factor is considered 'Absent'.

Ignorance, and lack of fore knowledge of the motives behind the introduction of the Shari'a law, is also a factor which contributed to the escalation of the violence. The reason for this perception is that the populace was not educated on the mode of implementation and operation of the Shari'a system. However, at the stage when the violence broke out, the government could do a little because as at that time, the matter was still being deliberated at the State House of Assembly. Nevertheless, the Christians preempted the verdict and presumed that if Shari'a law was to be implemented, it would have serious consequences on their way of life. In summary, both sides acted on an unclear message. If only the two religions had exercised a little patience the ugly encounter could have been averted. Therefore, based on this, the factor is considered 'Present'.

Kaduna crisis of February 2000 was started by an attempt to introduce and adopt the Shari'a penal code in the state. As discussed in chapters two and three, the issue of Shari'a has brought a new wave of violence in many parts of the country, Kaduna State inclusive. Therefore, 'Present' is considered the most appropriate for Shari'a penal code as a factor. Furthermore, the Kaduna violence of February 2000 was internal to the state because the researcher has not been able to establish any evidence that link the violence and any external influence. Therefore, this factor is considered negligible, hence it is 'Absent'.

The Gwantu Religious Crisis of November 2001

Many factors contributed to the crises at Gwantu. The first, being the change of name of the Numana Chiefdom from Chief of Numana to Chief of Gwantu. Next was the location of the permanent site of the local government secretariat and renaming the Customary Court in Gwantu as Shari'a Court by the State government. These caused sharp disagreement between the Chairman of Sanga Local Government, where Gwantu is located, Hon. (Dr.) Frank Bala Baba, a Christian, and the Chief of Numana, Alhaji Ahmadu Mohammed Yakubu, who is a Muslim. This and other issues, in which they disagree on, caused a religious divide between them and their adherents. They eventually opposed each other on any issue that affected the welfare and well-being of the Sanga people. According to the police:

The Muslim and Christian youths who had different interpretations on the burning issues, particularly the issue of the Shari'a Court, took to the street immediately after the Friday Muslim Jum'at prayers on 2 November 2001. These Muslim and Christian youths confronted each other and took to wanton burning of houses and vehicles, which resulted in loss of lives and property worth millions of Naira.¹⁴

The immediate causes of the crisis on 2 November 2001 could therefore be traced to the following:

1. The way and manner the Chief of Numana, Alhaji Ahmadu Mohammed Yakubu briefed the CAN and the Jamatul Nasirul Islam (JNI) representatives on 31 October 2001. Instead of persuading the Christians by explaining to them that the establishment of Shari'a and Customary Courts respectively would not affect their ways of life as brothers and sisters who have been living together for a long time, the Chief gave the impression that the Shari'a issue was final and non-negotiable.¹⁵ The way the

chief confronted the issue, lacked tact. This tactless approach to the issue of Shari'a Court further aggravated the tension already existing in the Chieftdom.

2. Both the Chief and the chairman were alleged to be instrumental in the Gwantu violence of November 2001. The chief was alleged by the Christian youth to have said that he was not asked to sample their opinion, rather he was directed to inform them of the Shari' a Court and that Shari'a has come to stay and advised the CAN and JNI representatives, who were not satisfied, to channel their grievances to the local government Chairman for solution. The Chairman was equally alleged to have aggravated the situation by leading them to believe that he had nothing to do with Shari'a but that the Chief of Numana, who voted for Shari'a, was instrumental in its implementation in Gwantu. The different interpretations by the 2 principal actors caused the 2 sides to threaten each other with use of cutlasses and other dangerous weapons, which eventually created panic and the mass exodus of non-indigenes out of Gwantu.

The Chairman of the Local Government, contrary to the directives of His Excellency, the Executive Governor of Kaduna State to stay around to monitor the situation, abandoned his Local Government Area before the crisis escalated. This action of the Chairman further fuelled the crisis as there was no government official to dialogue with the people to calm their frayed nerves.¹⁶ Because of this, he was suspended from office for 3 months by the Governor.

Violence eventually broke out, and police reports confirmed that 11 people were killed; 30 houses destroyed and 7 vehicles burnt. It was also recorded that the Chief of Numana's palace and his official car were also burnt.¹⁷ During the crisis, the entire village was deserted and the socio-political life of the village was paralyzed for almost 2

weeks. Again, the type of weapons used by the warring factions included knives, sticks, bows and arrows, locally made pistols, double-barrel shot guns and light automatic weapons.¹⁸

From the alleged roles played by the Chairman of Sanga Local Government, Hon. (Dr.) Frank Bala Baba and the Chief of Numana, Alhaji Ahmadu Mohammed Yakubu, it would be safe to say that the crisis attained that magnitude and recorded this level of death toll and destruction largely due to manipulation of the Muslim and Christian youths by these key figures. Both the chief and the chairman were later charged and prosecuted. It is therefore necessary to focus on these types of leaders in future crises.

Scoring of Variables

The Gwantu violence of November 2001 was critically analyzed. During the analysis, it was found out that its causes were religious, ethnical and political in nature. However, some factors appeared to have distinguished themselves as being more critical to the violence than others. It was found out that poverty occasioned by unemployment as a factor, appeared not to have any significant presence in the Gwantu violence. There is no substantial fact as to how this variable plays a role in the violence. Therefore, the scoring of this variable will be based on the researcher's appreciation of the violence. Hence, the factor is considered 'Absent'.

Furthermore, because of the ethno-religious distribution in the area, it is such that the Muslims were basically Hausa by tribe while all the Gwantu people were predominantly Christians. So, it is safe to assert that there was an element of ethno-religious dimension to the whole situation. Though, it is more religious in nature,

ethnicity also played its part. Therefore, religious intolerance and attachment of ethnicity to religion are both considered to be 'Present' during the violence.

Additionally, as discussed above, the renaming of the Numana chiefdom from Chief of Numana to Chief of Gwantu was seriously frowned on by the Gwantu Christian majority. The Christians perceived the action as an insult and a plot by the state government to marginalize them by eventually subjecting them to the direct control of the Muslim chief, and therefore objected to it. Thus, the violence, to a great extent, was as a result of the feeling and perceived deprivation, marginalization and dominance by the Gwantu Christian majority. This variable is considered one of the most influential of the other variables. Hence, it is considered 'Present'. Ignorance and illiteracy are other factors, which have played a role in the Gwantu crisis because the two sides were not quite conversant with the situation before they acted the way they did. Therefore, this variable is also considered 'Present' during the violence.

Furthermore, another reason for the violence was the attempt to change the customary court to sharia court, following the implementation of the modified version of the sharia by the Kaduna State. This was aggravated by the manner of the approach by the chief who, in his address to the CAN, and the JNI representatives on 31 October 2001, did not explain the pattern the implementation of the shari'a was going to take. Instead, he gave the impression that shari'a has come to stay. This single act of the chief has greatly influenced the violence. Hence, Shari'a is considered the most influential of all the factors responsible for this crisis, as such, it is 'Present'.

Finally, external influence as a factor appeared not to have any presence in the Gwantu violence. There is no fact as to how this variable plays any role in the violence.

Therefore, its score will be based on the researcher's appreciation of the violence. Hence, the factor is considered 'Absent' during this crisis. A summary of comparisons of deaths recorded and properties destroyed during the violence discussed above is indicated in the table below:

Table 2. Comparison of Deaths Recorded and Property Destroyed During the Above Discussed Violence

	People/ Police Killed	Houses destroyed	People/ Policemen Injured	People Displaced	Churches Burnt	Mosques Burnt	Vehicles Destroyed
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Zangon-Kataf	1,000+	5	15	500	7	2	8
Kaduna Crisis	354	400	103	5,000	75	28	245
Gwantu	11	30	10	150	3	1	7

Source: Police Investigation Report, Kaduna State 2001.

From the table above, the common characteristics that could be derived from the violence discussed within Kaduna State, is that in all three situations, the perpetrators extensively used firearms and other types of weapons to execute their acts. As such, there was a wanton destruction of lives and property in both cases. The number of people killed, injured and displaced in both cases clearly shows the devastation and consequent impact of these crises on Kaduna State. There is the need, therefore, to examine the

impact of the crises in Kaduna State with a view to proffering strategies for preventing or deescalating the violence when it occurs.

Furthermore, it was found out that all the violence examined have some political inclinations because all of them have the backings of some political elites or groups. It was also found out that, in all the violence studied, religion and ethnicity were intermingled to form one entity. In other words, some or all the violence will initially start as ethnic but when investigated, they usually boil down to having religious inclinations.

Impact of Ethnic and Religious Crises on Kaduna State

The nature of the 3 crises examined in the foregoing paragraphs, shows clearly that their manifestations have negative impacts on both the citizens and the State. To appreciate this assertion, it is important to examine the impact of the crises on the State under the following headings:

Economic Impact

Within the economic context of Kaduna State, the atmosphere of insecurity created during and after the crises disrupted productive activities and discouraged local and international investment. In fact, some foreign businessmen like the Lebanese, Philipinos and Israelis, who were non Muslims, left Kaduna State for other states or even their respective countries due to perceived personal insecurity since the crises had religious undertones.¹⁹ The destruction of lives, properties and infrastructure during the crises deprived the State of the use of its human and material resources as well as services. This was at the time of national economic hardship when all the states were

struggling for survival. Additionally, the funds meant for developmental projects in the state had to be diverted to crisis management thereby depriving the citizens of the basic necessities of life. The amount of money spent by Kaduna State and donor agencies on relief material during the February 2000 crisis was estimated to be approximately ₦18 million (approximately \$268,705).²⁰

Social Impact

Generally speaking, crises situations generate humanitarian catastrophes. In the case of Kaduna State situation, each of the crises discussed has caused an incredible amount of human suffering. According to the police report, very large populations in the areas affected were displaced during the incidents.²¹ In this crisis situation, farmlands were destroyed, markets, schools and business premises were closed down, and starvation became rampant. Hospitals and clinics were not opened to the public and the social life of the people was affected negatively. The displacement of persons resulted in separation of families and communities such that the social fabric of the society was torn apart.

As Enahoro observed, the element of risk, danger and uncertainty are usually present and would sometimes assume enormous proportion in a crisis situation.²² The police and the military public relations reports of the crises confirmed cases of large number of people being traumatized during the various crises.²³ The hospital where the wounded and traumatized people were admitted in Kafanchan, Kaduna and Zonkwa respectively also confirmed several cases of trauma.²⁴

Security Impact

Ethno- religious crises impacted negatively on the security of Kaduna State and the nation in general. The violence exhibited by both warring sides in the crises examined, produced domino effects that spread into the neighboring Plateau and Kano States. Also, the violence that ensued during these crises assumed great proportions as firearms were employed. This has lead to prolonging the conflicts.²⁵

The breakdown of law and order during the crises undermined public safety. For example, the Kaduna religious crisis lasted for about 2 weeks. During this period, citizens faced precarious movement conditions, risks, and dangers due to possible attack. Also the unsecured atmosphere provided an enabling environment for external interests groups who seized the opportunity for subversive activities to destabilize the state and the nation. For example, SSS Reports from Kano State and that of Kaduna State confirms the influx of hooligans into Kaduna some days after the crisis began. Their militia activities amplified the violence displayed and damages and killings that occurred later.²⁶

Political Impact

A crisis adversely affects political stability. Within the context of this study, political stability means the ability of a political system to maintain equilibrium. It also connotes the ability of a government to retain legitimacy, and carry out its normal functions while retaining the support of the people within a stable range.²⁷ The prevalence of crises in Kaduna State and the breakdown of law and order which occurred during the period, and by extension the power of the authority and democratic order, reflects policy failures by the Local Government Areas and sometimes by even the state government. The situation also reflects the ineffectiveness of measures put in place by the

Kaduna State government to curb the occurrences and reoccurrence of crises. Thus, the prevalence of ethnic and religious crises in Kaduna State are important sources of political instability.

It can be deduced from the examination of the nature and impact of the ethnic and religious conflicts in Kaduna State that the phenomenon poses serious threats to national security, peaceful co-existence, political stability, development and wellbeing of the citizens. The nature of these crises also affected the non-indigenes of the State who had to relocate to their home states.

A Case Study of Taliban Activities In Borno State

General Overview of the Taliban Phenomenon

The word Taliban is an Arabic word, meaning student. It first came to public knowledge in the early 90s when a group of Islamic students from different parts of the Middle East and Asia came together in Afghanistan to establish a purely Islamic state, governed by the precepts of Islamic Law. After the fall of the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1992, Afghanistan was thrown into a civil war between the competing warlords. The Taliban emerged as a force able to bring order to this power vacuum.²⁸ It brought economic benefits by eliminating the numerous payments that were required to be made to the different warlords; it brought political benefits by reducing fighting between factions (although the Taliban fought aggressively against its enemies, its relative hegemony reduced the number of factions); and it brought social benefits by imposing a set of norms on a chaotic society.

The Taliban enjoyed considerable support from Pashtun Afghans and Pakistan. The United States hoped that the Taliban might push the warlords to resolve their

differences and choose a ‘hands-off’ policy.²⁹ Although the radical ideology of the Taliban later alienated many, several observers initially considered its emergence as a positive development. They were able to seize power through military means, capturing the capital Kabul in 1995. Fears about the regime became apparent when they promoted a male-dominated culture that did not give regards to women in public life, even as teachers, doctors or nurses. They were later tagged terrorist by the US when it was discovered that they harbored Osama Bin Laden, who had been declared wanted for the bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The demise of the Taliban stemmed from its association with Osama Bin Laden and his connection with the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001.³⁰

Overview of the Taliban of Borno State

According to local sources, the group presently referred to as the Taliban in Borno State, was initially known by various names. Some referred to it as Al-Sunna Wal Jamma.³¹ According to the then Yobe State Governor, Alhaji Bukar Abba Ibrahim, “information available to the state government indicates that the name of the group is Ahlul Sunnah Wa-Jama’ah.”³² However, Sheikh Jafar Mahmud, a prominent Islamic scholar at the Indimi Central Mosque, Maiduguri, with large followers in Borno and Yobe states, argues that the group’s members were never Ahlul Sunnah Wa-Jama’ah but members of a sect known as the Muhajirun Wal-Takhfir” with large supporters in Sudan and Egypt.³³

The Nigerian Taliban, which refers to itself as the Muhajirun (migrants) movement, first appeared on the scene in 2003 and was primarily composed of religious students, just like the Afghan group, whose name they adopted. Inspired by the latter's

vision of an Islamic State ruled with an extremist interpretation of the Muslim faith, the Nigerian so called Taliban abandoned Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State, and migrated away to the bushes of Yobe State near the border with the Niger Republic.³⁴ Descending from their wilderness retreat, the young militants raided the Yobe State capital, Damaturu, in early 2004, where they attacked several police stations. Later that same year, the militants tried to launch a guerrilla campaign around Gwoza, in Borno State near the Cameroon border.³⁵

While trying to dig into what motivated the group to act the way it did, an associate professor of sociology at the University of Maiduguri, Abdulmumin Sa'ad said that:

Although the deconstruction of the issue may look simple to some people, it is very complex and the bottom-line is either the existence of actual or perceived injustice in the society. So, because of apparent injustice, a lot of the religious scholars not only in Islam but even in Christianity speak against it. Since you have a pack of frustrated people, it is very easy to mobilize them. And we have a lot of ideologues either religious groups or politicians, who usually seize such opportunity to mobilize apparently, frustrated young people against the authority or against other groups.³⁶

Objectives of the Group

According to Sheikh Mahmud, the belief of the sect, from which the Taliban originated, was that anyone who is not part of them is a sinner, regardless of his faith. In Nigeria, specifically, the intention of the group was the establishment of an independent Islamic State out of the present-day Nigeria, comprising the areas in the vicinities of Kannama, Yunusari and Toshiya in Yobe state. The new state, as explained in the leaflets which they distributed, would be placed under the leadership of Mullah Omar, the wanted former leader of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The secondary objective of the

group, as contained in the leaflets was to mobilize all Muslims to prepare for Islamic revolution (Jihad) and kill any security agent they considered a nonbeliever.³⁷

Leadership of the Group

It is unclear as to who actually heads the group. The Nigerian Police claimed that;

A man called Mohammed Yusuf, a Maiduguri-based imam was the group's leader. In December 2006, Mohammed Yusuf, was charged with five counts of illegally receiving foreign currency. His trial was still ongoing as at the end of 2007.³⁸

Also in December 2006, a man called Mohammed Ashafa, of Kano State, was charged with receiving funds in 2004 from two Al-Qaida (AQ) operatives based in Lahore,

Pakistan to identify and carry out terrorist attacks on American residences in Nigeria.³⁹

Ashafa was said to be deported from Pakistan for alleged ties to AQ, and was said to have undergone terrorist training in Mauritania. He was charged in a Nigerian court with recruiting 21 fighters who were sent to Camp Agwan in Niger Republic for terrorist training with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).⁴⁰ Also, he was accused of being a courier for AQ from 2003 to 2004, who passed coded messages from Pakistan to Nigerian Taliban members on how to carry out terrorist activities against American interests in Nigeria. In addition, Nigerian authorities alleged that Ashafa's home was used as an AQ safe house, and that he rendered logistical and intelligence support to AQ operatives.⁴¹

On January 16, 2007, Mohammed Bello Ilyas Damagun, a Nigerian cleric described by prosecutors as a primary sponsor of the Nigerian Taliban, was arraigned on three count charge of terrorism. Damagun was accused of receiving the sum of \$300,000 from Sudanese extremists, or an AQ affiliate in Sudan, with the intent that the money

would be used in the execution of acts of terrorism. He also allegedly sent three young men to train with AQIM in Mauritania. The final count in Damagun's indictment was for aiding terrorist activities in Nigeria. This trial was ongoing with the defendant out on bail.⁴²

Membership

According to Yobe State Governor Ibrahim, members of the group include children of influential people in Borno state (which is predominantly the Kanuri Tribe), with a few people from the Hausa and Yoruba tribes in their midst.⁴³ The youths are also believed to be predominantly university students who began to form a network either at the University of Maiduguri, or after they had graduated or dropped out from that institution.⁴⁴

Source of Arms and Ammunition

Members of the group have used AK-47 assault rifles in their confrontations with the Nigeria Police and Army. Security sources reports that the group also possesses sophisticated shoulder-launched weapons systems, although this could not be independently verified. In January 2004, members of the group invaded two police stations in the towns of Geidam and Kanamma and seized guns and ammunition. They also reportedly carried away large amount of guns and ammunition from attacks on police stations in Borno State.⁴⁵ The primary means of obtaining weapons is by attacking security agents and their installations.

Sources of Financial Support

The group is believed to have minimal support among the local population. Nigerian authorities detained the head of the Kano-based Almundata Al-Islam Foundation for allegedly financing the group.⁴⁶ However, security sources pointed out that, given the kind of sophisticated weapons and communication equipment recovered from the members of the group, it is almost certain that they have the financial support from very strong sources. This is an unconfirmed assertion.

Activities and Confrontation with the Police

Accounts by local sources, according to Abdulrafi'u, indicate that the activities of the group first became noticeable during the first half of 2003, when they gathered under the name the Hijrah (Migration) Movement, established a base near Nigeria's border with Niger Republic and designated their base as an "Islamic State."⁴⁷ On 22 December, 2003 at about 01:30hours, they attacked the Kanama Divisional Police headquarters, Yunusari Local Government Area, Yobe State. They killed Police Constable Mohammed Yakubu and removed arms and ammunition from the armory.⁴⁸

Reacting to the development, the Police mobilized a half unit of the Mobile Police Force (MPF) and some regular policemen and confronted them on 23 December, 2003. After about two hours of unsuccessful action, the Police retreated. The group re-mobilized and set on fire the residences of the Local Government Chairman, the Divisional Police Officer (DPO), the Police Station, and Government Lodge. Others also burnt were the Local Government Secretariat, residence of the District Head, Police Headquarters and police vehicles.⁴⁹

Again, on 28 December 2003, the group attacked the Divisional Police Headquarters Geidam, Geidam Local Government Area, Yobe State, and removed unspecified arms and ammunition, 160, 000 (Naira) cash meant for payment of salaries to some policemen, 2 police patrol vehicles and police communication equipment. The Divisional Police Headquarters, Damaturu, Yobe State, was also attacked and an inspector of police killed and one other policeman was wounded.⁵⁰ In reaction to the attack, a combined team of the police and army was deployed against the insurgents, forcing them to flee to the Mandara Mountains on the northeast border with Cameroon. During the military operations, twenty-eight members of the group, including 2 women and one child, were killed with 5 sustaining injuries; 13 others were arrested at their camp in Borno state. Security forces recovered a total of 50 assault rifles and hundreds of round of ammunition.⁵¹

On 20 September 2004, the Taliban launched another attack against the police and the government installations. They raided the police stations in Bama and Gwoza, both in Borno State, killing four police officers and two civilians as well as stealing ammunition. According to the Commissioner of Police, Ade Ajakaiye, the Taliban, numbering about 60 first struck in Bama station before proceeding to Gwoza. They took seven people hostage, at least two of whom they later killed. By 27 September 2004, five of the militants, who were attempting to enter Cameroon, were arrested by the authorities of that country and Nigeria and soon thereafter requested for their extradition to Nigeria for prosecution.⁵²

Reactions from the Local Muslim Population

It is generally believed that the group did not enjoy the popular support of the greater Muslim communities. This is an indication of the group's lack of support. Their violent activities did not provoke any generalized breakdown of relations between the Christian minority and the Moslem community in the region. A local Muslim scholar, Sheihk Yusuf, contends that the activities of the group run contrary to Islamic injunctions. He notes that the group's very first action of embarking on Hijra was an action by a "bunch of overzealous youths with little or no understanding of Hadith and the Holy Qur'an."⁵³ He observed that when Prophet Mohammed embarked on Hijra from Mecca to Medina centuries ago, it was because idol worshipers had made life unbearable for him and his community. But in the case of the Taliban, no one has persecuted or stopped them from observing their prayers, and no effort by them towards promoting Islam had in any way been frustrated. He therefore submits that the Hijra, and other acts which the group had undertaken, were unlawful and should be treated as offences against the state.⁵⁴

Scoring of Variables

Consequent upon the above analysis of the Taliban activities in Borno State, so many realities have come to the fore. Its causes, nature and impacts are now well understood. Based on the above discussion, it is now clear that poverty occasioned by unemployment has added to group's ability to garner followers. From what was gathered, majority of the group's supporters were dropouts and graduates from university of Maiduguri. If these youths were employed, they wouldn't have had the willingness and zeal to join the organization. Though, most of the adherents of the movement were

unemployed, most of them came from a noble background. What then motivated them to resort to this form of violence is still a matter of contention. Hence, this factor is negligible therefore, considered 'Absent'.

Furthermore, based on the analysis above, religious intolerance as a variable is considered 'Present'. This is because the researcher believed that the activities of the Nigerian Taliban were as a result of lack of tolerance inherent or propagated into their minds, by whoever their mentors are. Consequently, it is deemed appropriate to consider attachment of ethnicity to religious as not being a contributing agent in the Nigerian Taliban activities in Borno State. This is because this group is comprised of different ethnic groups and was not fighting against a particular ethnic group. For this reason, their activities cannot be termed to have any ethnic nature in it. Hence, it is considered 'Absent'.

Deprivation, marginalization and dominance are factors that are believed to have a serious influence in the activities of the Nigerian Taliban. The activities of this group were basically as a result of what they perceived as maladministration and injustices by the government. This deduction is informed by the group's actions against police stations and local government secretariats. These factors are therefore considered to be 'Present' in this crisis.

Illiteracy and ignorance as a factor is considered a key in facilitating the activities of Nigerian Taliban. From the discussion above, it can be construed that majority of the group's adherents lack basic Islamic knowledge. They are ignorant of the teachings of the Holy Qur'an and the Hadith. This could be seen by the group's misinterpretation of hijra

(migration) as it relates to Prophet Muhammad. Hence, this variable is also considered 'Present'.

Because of what the Taliban perceived as maladministration and injustices by the government and its agencies, the group vowed to establish an Islamic State, based on Shari'a law, which they (the group) considered the most appropriate way of administering justice. In this regard, justice is the end and Shari'a is the means to their end, while violence through attacks is the way in which the group chose to achieve the end. Therefore, Shari'a penal code as factor is considered important and 'Present' during this crisis.

From the study so far conducted on the activities of Taliban in Nigeria, it is evident that the group's actions are influenced by certain external forces. It is believed that the group enjoys the support of some insurgents and terrorist organizations from around the world. As discussed above, the presumed group's leaders Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Ashafa, were all alleged to have links with AQ. Some of the members of the group were also assumed to have received some training from the AQ cohort, the AQIM. With all these in mind, it is safe to conclude that the Nigerian Taliban has some level of affiliation with terrorist organizations, especially the Afghan Taliban, considering their mode of recruitment and ideology. Thus, external influence as a factor is considered 'Present'.

Measures Adopted by Government to Arrest the Taliban Problem

In responding to the problem of Taliban in Borno State, the federal and state governments have relied largely on the statutory security agencies. These are primarily

the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), SSS, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and the Nigeria Custom Service (NCS). While the NPF is charged with the prevention, detection and investigation of crimes, it also has an important role to play in the maintenance of law and order, and in guaranteeing the safety of citizens. The SSS has primary responsibility to provide prompt and accurate intelligence that enables the government to formulate policies and respond to security threats.⁵⁵

The NIS, which is responsible for regulating the movement of persons in and out of the country, has a role to play in monitoring the ingress of religious militants. The NCS, which is charged with monitoring and regulating the import and export of goods into the country, has an implied responsibility to prevent trafficking of illegal material into Nigeria, like the small arms that are used by religious militants and other violent elements. In the face of the threats posed by the Taliban, these agencies appear not to have been able to function optimally as was required in order to preempt the militants or neutralize them completely.

In the course of an interview, it was established that the Yobe State Command of the SSS had, as early as August 2003, provided intelligence to the state government on the presence and build-up of the group.⁵⁶ The Command continued to monitor the group and briefed the Governor and the Commissioner of Police (CP) as its activities and strength increased. The SSS advised the Governor to use the Emirate Council and religious leaders to intervene “as their religious activities are likely to provoke a crisis.”⁵⁷

The SSS followed up with detailed intelligence reports to the police on the group’s leadership structure, location, strength, ideology and vulnerabilities. On 6 September, 2003, the then DPO for Yunusari Local Government Area invited the

identified leaders of the group, (Usman Ibn Abdulkadir, Abu Umar, Muhammad Sallisu, M. Ahmed and Mohammad Yusuf) for discussion, but they ignored the invitation.

Thereafter, the Yobe Command of the SSS, through the Traditional Council engaged the leaders of the group represented by the 6 persons – Mallam Umar, Mohammed Sani, Ahmed Umar, Abdulkadir Mallam, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Saleh – in an interactive session. The group was advised to desist from provocative preaching and anti-government messages. In reaction, however, the group called on Muslims to disengage their children and wards from what they called Western education.⁵⁸

In October 2003, the intelligence provided to the State government and Police by the SSS revealed that the group's preaching sessions had extended to various villages and hamlets, and that its members were distributing pamphlets and leaflets that attacked modernity and democracy. The report resulting from this advised the State government to use all within its persuasive arsenals to send this group out of the area.⁵⁹ The State Government reacted by tasking the State Religious Committee to handle the development.⁶⁰

In November 2003, the SSS further reported the group's harassment of women at streams for dressing in an un-Islamic manner and men from listening to radio which they considered exposure to Western corruption and culture. The development was put on the agenda and deliberated upon during the State's Security Council meeting for that month and the police were tasked to take appropriate action. Reacting to the pressure mounted by the police and the State Religious Committee, the group relocated to the border with Niger Republic. It was from there that they launched their attacks a month later.⁶¹

While intelligence on the Taliban activities seems to have been available, the reaction of the state government was slow and the response of the Police to the assaults that were mounted by the group seems to have been inadequate. The fact that in December 2003 and September 2004 the army had to be drafted in to help the police in fighting the militants is an indication that the police are under-manned, inadequately trained, or ill-equipped to meet with the threat. Furthermore, the fact that the Taliban has been able to repeatedly organize itself in the country's border regions, and cross over to Niger, Chad and Cameroon Republics when being pursued by the army and the police, indicates that the Custom and Immigration Services cannot contain the porosity of those border regions. Two basic deductions can be made from the foregoing. First, the cases of religious-based violence, including the activities of the Taliban in Borno State, constitute far-reaching implications for national security. Secondly, the phenomenon of religious-based violence has not been accorded effective response by the government and its security agencies.

Table 3. Scoring of Variables against the Selected Violence

		CASE STUDIES						
		KADUNA			BORNO			
S/NO	VARIABLES	Zangon-Kataf Crisis	Kaduna Crisis	Gwantu Crisis	Taliban Activities		Number of A and P	
		Present = 'P' and Abcent = 'A' (APPLICABILITY)						
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)		
						A	P	
1.	Poverty Occasioned by Unemployment	A	P	A	A	3	1	
2.	Religious Intolerance	P	P	P	P	0	4	
3.	Attachment of Ethnicity to Religion	P	A	P	A	2	2	
4.	Deprivation, Marginalization and Dominance	P	A	P	P	1	3	
5.	Illiteracy/Ignorance	P	P	P	P	0	4	
6.	Sharia Penal Code	A	P	P	P	1	3	
7.	External Influence	A	A	A	P	3	1	

Source: Created by Author

From the table above, it can be deduced that religious intolerance; illiteracy and ignorance; perceived deprivation, marginalization and domination; and Shari'a penal code are the foremost causes of violence in Nigeria. This can be seen from the number of absence and presence of the selected variables against the chosen case studies. It is also noticed that any crisis caused by any or a combination of two or all of these variables,

usually assumed a high degree of devastation of both lives and or property. It is therefore imperative for government at all levels to keep focus on these variables and pay more attention to any situation in which these factors appear as indicators of possible violence or crisis.

Furthermore, attachment of ethnicity to religion is the next in order of applicability to Nigeria's violent crisis situation. It is most probably because this variable cannot cause crisis alone without collaboration with other factors. But in a case where this factor combine with any of the ones mentioned in the preceding paragraph, usually tends to have a very ugly and devastating result. It is therefore viewed as fueling an already uneasy situation. In other words, it add salt to an injury.

Differences and Commonalities of the Two Case Studies

The situations in both of the two states considered as case studies during the course of this research were found to be different in many respects. Apart from the fact that the two states are situated in separate geographical zones of the country, the ways and manners in which the violence was considered and occurred varied greatly. While the acts of violence in Kaduna state were largely between the adherents of Islam and Christianity or between different ethnicities, that of Borno state happened between adherents of a sect referred to as Muhajirun and the State.

Furthermore, the Taliban violence in Borno state has some external delineation and backings, allegedly from AQ and the Taliban of Afghanistan, as against the violence in Kaduna State, which was basically internal to the state. However, the two cases shared some similarities, in the sense that both have religious undertones and backgrounds.

Impact of Religious Violence on the Nigerian State

The upsurge of religious-based violence has been recognized as a major threat to Nigeria's national security. The Hon. Minister of Defence, Alhaji Rabi'u Musa

Kwankwaso identifies this threat as:

The increasing manifestation of religious fanaticism as evidenced by the communal crises in Shagamu, Lagos, Aba and Kano, and the religious upheavals in Kaduna, Bauchi and Jos as well as avoidable intolerance constitute a serious threat to national security.⁶²

The impact of religious-based violence on the Nigerian Nation State can be identified in several aspects of national life which are outlined below:

Undermining of National Unity

The unity and peaceful co-existence of all socio-cultural groups in the country is one of the core values of the Nigerian nation. Over the years since independence a great deal of both human and material resources has been expended for the preservation of this value. The 1999 Constitution, like those of 1960, 1963, 1979 and 1989, indicates that the Nigerian people have "resolved to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation."⁶³ Incidence of religious-based violence create disharmony among Nigerians, polarize the citizens into mutually hostile religious camps, and thereby undermine the solemn commitment to unity which is an important pillar of the Nigerian state.

Undermining the Stability of the Nigerian State

The leaders of some of the religious groups that have been involved in acts of violence since the 1980s have made it clear that they are opposed to the Nigerian state and its governing institutions. Their campaigns therefore have been aimed at either

establishing enclaves of Islamic rule (as the Taliban of Borno State sought to do in 2004) or waging the wider campaign for the enthronement of Islamic rule nationwide (as Maitatsine and El-Zakzaky sought to do in the 1980s and early 1990s). Whichever is the case, these campaigns run contrary to Section 1 (1) of the 1999 Constitution which states that “the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the government of Nigeria or any part thereof except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”⁶⁴ What this implies is that the groups which are using violence to advance their religious and political agenda are indeed seeking to overthrow the government of Nigeria.

Undermining the Nigeria Police Force and other Security Agencies

Incidents of religious-based violence undermine the effectiveness of the Nigeria Police and other security agencies in at least two major ways. For one, attacks on Police stations and Police units have led to the killing of many service personnel, destruction of important security facilities and looting of armories, which often result in the guns available to the Police being passed to unauthorized persons.

Mass Killings and Destruction of Economic Activities

The many incidence of religious-based violence since the 1980s have led to the massacre of thousands of citizens, many of these citizens were in the able bodied group and were contributing to the development of the Nigerian state. Their loss therefore represents a loss to the development of the nation. Religious riots have also had highly destructive effects on economic activities. The riots in Kaduna and Jos in 2000 and 2003 respectively resulted in extensive destruction of public infrastructure, private property

and economic activities. While the Nigeria government have been promoting Plateau state as a favorable destination for local and foreign tourists (as part of the strategy for enhancing the nation's non-oil export revenue), the 2003 riots in Jos, Plateau State and its environs completely eroded whatever progress have been made on that campaign.

Displacement of Populations and Creation of Refugee Problems

The activities of the groups engaged in religious-based violence have over the years led to the sudden and mass displacement of large population groups within the country. For instance, between late December 2003 and early January 2004, at least 10,000 inhabitants of the towns of Babangida, Dankalawar, Geidam and Kannama in Yobe state were forced to flee their homes owing to fighting between the Talibans and government forces. Such displacement of population has created serious humanitarian problems, forcing government to divert resources that would have been used to enhance economic security.

Undermining the Nation's Image Abroad

Since the 1980s, repeated incidence of religious-based violence, have tended to portray the country in a very negative light before the international community. This unhealthy image not only scares away investors and tourists who would have brought in much-needed capital to the country, but also undermines the country's campaigns on such issues as hosting international sporting events and representing Africa in the United Nations Security Council.

¹S. Tokunbo Osinubi, and Oladipupo Sunday Osinubi, *Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Africa: The Nigerian Experience*, <http://www.krepublishers.com/02->

Journals/JSS/JSS-12-0-000-000-2006-Web/JSS-12-2-083-158-2006-Abst-Text/JSS-12-2-083-158-2006-Web/JSS-12-2-101-114-2006-165-Osinubi-T-S/JSS-12-2-101-114-2006-165-Osinubi-T-S-Text.pdf (accessed 30 March 2009).

²Eghosa E. Osaghae, *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence*, http://books.google.com/books?id=JxaBkN3z28cC&dq=Eghosa+E.+Osaghae,+Crippled+Giant:+Nigeria+Since+Independence&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=vn7GI_tIDp&sig=VWsIT8KoRSJ6ZAIInPtcqLibYBK4&hl=en&ei=AiLRSbGXHo2usQOj_K2gAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result (accessed 30 March 2009).

³*Police Investigation Report, Kaduna State, 2001.*

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Zangon-Kataf: For Peace to Endure*, <http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/09/09/20010909news03.html> (accessed 25 March 2009).

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Police, 2001.*

⁹*Police Investigation Report on Kaduna Sharia Religious Crisis of February 2000.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ethnic and Religious Rights Quarterly*, 1.no.1 (October 1999), 9-10.

¹³*Police, 2001.*

¹⁴*Police Investigation Report on Gwantu Religious Crisis of November 2001.*

¹⁵*Police Investigation Report from personal interrogation.*

¹⁶*Police, 2001.*

¹⁷*Ibid*

¹⁸*Ibid*

¹⁹*Police, 2000.*

²⁰*Police Investigation Report on Misappropriation of Relief Funds for the February 2000 Kaduna Sharia/Religious crisis.*

- ²¹*Police*, 2000.
- ²²D.O. Enahoro, “*Mechanism for Intra-State Crisis in Africa*,” in Garuba CA (ed) *Capacity Building for Crisis Management in Africa* (Abuja: National War College, 1998), 108.
- ²³*Police Report and Nigerian Army Report on Kaduna State Crisis Submitted to Justice Dalhatu Ja’afaru Investigation Panel*, June 2001.
- ²⁴*Police Investigation Reports of Kaduna and Kafanchan Crises*.
- ²⁵*Police*, 2000.
- ²⁶*Kano and Kaduna States State Security Service Progress Reports on Security Situations in the States during the Kaduna State Ethnic and Religious Crisis of 2001*.
- ²⁷G.B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies, Participation, Stability and Violence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 169.
- ²⁸M. Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Q'aida and the Holy War* (London: Pluto Press; 2003), 13.
- ²⁹*Ibid*.
- ³⁰*Ibid*, 23.
- ³¹L. Abdulrafiiu “*The Rout of the ‘Talibans’*” TELL, 19 January 2004, 27.
- ³²*Ibid*.
- ³³*Interview* on 18 December 2004.
- ³⁴J.P. Peter, *Strategic Interest World Defense Review*, <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham020107.shtml> (accessed 15 February 2009).
- ³⁵*Ibid*.
- ³⁶Bego Abdullahi, *Taliban’ of Nigeria: Who Are They?* Weekly_Trust, Abuja; 3 – 9 January 2004. 2.
- ³⁷*Ibid*.
- ³⁸*United States Department of States, Country Report on Terrorism – Nigeria*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOS,,NGA,,48196c9a1a,0.html> (accessed 15 February 2009).
- ³⁹*Ibid*.

- ⁴⁰Ibid.
- ⁴¹Ibid.
- ⁴²Ibid.
- ⁴³Abdulrafiu. *The Rout of the 'Talibans'*
- ⁴⁴Ibid.
- ⁴⁵*Nigerian troops intensify action against fleeing Islamic militants*,
<http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040927140350.av6mwpbi.html> (accessed 15 February 2009).
- ⁴⁶“The Routing of the Talibans,” *Newswatch* (4 October 2004), 16.
- ⁴⁷Abdulrafiu, *The Rout of the 'Talibans'*
- ⁴⁸Ibid.
- ⁴⁹*Details of the “Yobe Taliban Crises of 2003”, report compiled for State Security Council Deliberation, January 2004.*
- ⁵⁰Ibid.
- ⁵¹Ibid.
- ⁵²“*Nigerian Troops intensify action against fleeing Islamic militants.*”
- ⁵³*Unpublished Interview* on 20 December 2004.
- ⁵⁴Ibid.
- ⁵⁵*Federal Government of Nigeria, The Nigeria Police Act 1967*
- ⁵⁶U. Akoma, “*The State Security Service and Management of Internal Security in Nigeria, 1999 – 2003,*” project submitted to National War College; May 2004, 5.
- ⁵⁷*Report by the State Security Service to the Executive Governor of Yobe State*, S. 1/2069 of 12 August 2003.
- ⁵⁸Ibid.
- ⁵⁹*Report to the Executive Governor of Yobe State* TS.7/289 of 25 November 2003.
- ⁶⁰Akoma, U. *Op.Cit.*, 47.
- ⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Rabiu M. Kwankwaso, Lecture on National Defense Policy Objectives, delivered to Participant of National War College, Nigeria, Course 13, 4 January 2005.

⁶³Federal Government of Nigeria. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1999).

⁶⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

This study was set out to examine religious-based violence as a phenomenon, in Nigeria, with a view to identifying some of the key causes of the violence, its impact on the country's economy and national security, and proffer possible recommendations on how the peril could be avoided or mitigated whenever it occurs. During the course of the study, the researcher also identified several factors that have been contributing to this trend. Among these factors are the emergence of more militant sects and adherents within the two major religions (Christianity and Islam); the tendency of some Muslim sects to rebel against the existing political order and enthrone an Islamic theocracy; the exploitation of religion by the elite in the vicious competition for the nation's resources; the collapse of rural economies, especially in the more arid states of the far north, which has swollen ghetto populations with mostly unemployed youth; and the intensification of various social and economic inequities especially in the northern states.

Recommendations

Consequent upon the analysis of religious violence in the two case studies discussed in the preceeding chapter, and judging from the conclusion reached in table 1 above, the menace of religious violence could be curtailed or minimized, if the government of Nigeria could implement the following recommendations:

Promoting a Culture of Religious Tolerance

To effectively mitigate the persistent occurrence of religious violence in Nigeria, the government need to be pro-active in prompting the culture of tolerance by adherents of the two religions. The best way to do that is through education and enlightenment of the people through the mass media, civil society organizations and educational institutions to respect and tolerate other religions as well as extol the culture of others. Adherents of both religions should also be enlightened through the use of credible religious scholars, to imbibe the habit of reporting through the right channel, if offended by any member or group of the opposing religion instead of taking laws into someones hands without recourse to rule of law.

It is essential that people be educated not to follow religion blindly, especially in the Nigerian context where people imbibed religious traditions through accident of birth. History teaches that the two world religions were introduced into Nigeria as external change-agents at some point in time. Reception was hardly dictated by either reasoned choice or even theological understanding. Each of these religions accepts change; none is static; so the opportunity exists to study, to know, to share both affirmed and acquired traditions with others.

There is an imperative for dialogue between the two competing religious systems. It is clear that the state cannot indoctrinate people into viable morality. Corrupt rulers cannot inculcate discipline. That task is for the religious community. Dialogue means more than tolerance or even debate. It is a relationship rather than discourse. However, such dialogue between faiths could be planned through lectures, debates, literature and so

on. The goal of such dialogue must be to take the rough edges off religious differences in a secular pluralistic polity, and to tap the salient values which affirm life in all religions.

Alleviation of Illiteracy and Ignorance

Illiteracy/ignorance is identified as the key causative factor of religious violence in Nigeria. In order to counter the influence of those religious leaders, who usually seize the opportunity to manipulate their adherents, there is the need therefore for the government to establish religious institutions where by well learned and credible religious scholars are employed to educate people on religious issues, and the need for coexistence regardless of religion, ethnicity or tribe. By this, people will be able to differentiate between the good and the bad, and between right and wrong. They will also know when they are being used to foment violence. They will also be able to differentiate between wrong and right.

A Clearly Defined Shari'a Penal Code

A clearly defined Shari'a system, which stipulate the scope of its application and those to be governed by the code will help a great deal in reducing some of the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the system. It is therefore recommended that the Nigerian government should make a public declaration that will clarify the issue of Shari'a in the country. Also, the various governments of the states, where Shari'a is being practiced, should organize forums whereby people will be educated on the application of Shari'a penal code. These could be done through media forums and interviews.

Good Governance

Good governance is another way in which religious violence could be minimize or averted. There is need for government at all levels, from federal to local level, to show accountability, transparency, responsiveness, equity and justice. Government that is effective and efficient, and govern by the rule of law, is most likely to succeed in its fight against crises and conflicts. Good governance assures that corruption, deprivation, marginalization and dominance are pushed aside and views of the people are taken into consideration. If this situation exist, various religions and ethnic groups will have a sense of belonging and thereby cooperate with the government and even accept to live side by side with one another, regardless of their tribes, ethnicity or religions. Also, good governance can be improved upon through the establishment of governmental reform programs and anti corruption commissions that should hold accountable, any government official who mismanage his or her office. Furthermore, there is the need to empower the already existing programs, so that they will have power to prosecute the culprits.

Establishment of National Reconciliation Forum

Because of the interconnectivity of religion with ethnicity in Nigeria, which is mostly the creation of its colonial masters, when they applied the ‘Divide and Rule’ system of governance, some trivial issues that should not under normal circumstances take much time to be resolved tends to degenerate into a more precarious and dangerous ethnic or religious crises. There is therefore the need for the government of Nigeria to form a reconciliation committee that should organize a forum whereby reputed and credible religious and ethnic figures will come together to brainstorm each other through lectures on the need to consider one another as Nigerians regardless of religion or

ethnicity. A committee that will disabuse the minds of Nigerians from the legacies left behind by the colonial power, which encourages religious and ethnic inclination rather than nationalism.

Provision of Employment Opportunities and Establishment of Poverty Erradication Programs

In order for the government to eradicate or reduce the level of unemployment in the country, it first of all need to encourage the general public on the importance of education and the need to go back to school to acquire atleast the basic knowledge needed to be productive in the society. Furthermore, the government need to complement this by providing employment opportunities to those who possesses the requirements to get employments. Meanwhile, these are not enough. There also the need for concrete measures to be put in place to eradicate the abject poverty that is known to exist among the majority of Nigerians. If this occurred, it is believed that the intensity, which crises usually have, will reduce to the barest minimum

This study acknowledges the fact that Nigeria has embarked on various programs on poverty alleviation and employment generation, but with little success. The application of the social security strategy through the establishment of more vocational centers, to absorb the teeming unemployed youth and provision of small loans so that young people might start their own micro businesses will reduce their susceptibility of being used to foment crises and violence. This will no doubt reduce the cost of preventing or managing crises when they crop up.

Promoting Bilateral Cooperation on Immigration and Border Security

Since the Maitatsine riot in 1980, up to the Taliban phenomenon of the last few years, there has been evidence of either the involvement of foreign element in religious-based violence in Nigeria or easy passage for the Nigerian architects of such violence when pursued by the security agents. The Nigerian government therefore must strengthen its cooperation with neighboring countries to stem the influx of religious fundamentalists and arrest the flight of fugitives wanted in connection with religious crimes in the country. This should involve greater cooperation on joint border patrols, exchange of intelligence between security agencies of neighboring countries (including intelligence on religious sects), and the strengthening of extradition arrangements that would facilitate the return of wanted persons for prosecution once they have been arrested in a neighboring country.

Funding and Logistics

To enhance security operations, there is need for a special increase in budgetary allocation to the security agencies. This will help to increase their personnel and also update, upgrade and modernize their equipment holdings and professionalize the police. There is therefore, the need for citizens to engage the National Assembly and governments at all levels in demanding to increase funding and equipping these agencies in order to meet increasing security challenges.

Close Coordination Between Security Agencies

In the management of religious violence in Nigeria, close collaboration between the security agencies is necessary to prevent it or reduce it to a minimum level. This can

be achieved through regular meetings to appraise security situations and exchange vital information in respect of possible crises areas and situations. This strategy has proved effective in advanced nations of the world especially Great Britain and the US.¹ For instance, according to Black in the US, Interpol relies heavily on information furnished it by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).² This capability, if properly applied, will provide the security agencies a better approach towards preventing or managing crises whenever they occur. It will also reduce the cost of logistics and personnel required to handle such crises situations.

Controlling the Flow of Firearms

Efforts at mopping up all illegally acquired small arms in the country will help in reducing the impact of religious crises whenever they occur. This can be achieved through regular security aids and buy-back programs. A good example is that of Rivers State Government that offered money to Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the leader of the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF) to surrender his arms. This paid off as thousands of arms and stores of ammunition were handed over to the government.³ While some observed that the militant leader turned in obsolete weapons and got money to buy new ones, the mopping up strategy could be perfected and made more effective.

The federal government could also encourage a situation whereby the arms do not come in at all through close monitoring and vigilance by the Customs and the Police. This could be achieved through professionalizing the security agencies, who are in most cases, the cause. There is also the need for security agencies like the police to regularly raid known gunrunners, those who are locally making weapons and criminal hideouts to prevent firearms from getting into the hands of the wrong people. The use of this mop-up

strategy will go a long way to reduce crises and also manage them at a lower cost whenever they do occur.

Utilization of Early Warning Signals

According to Hopple, Androile and Freedy, “early warning signal is a credible strategy of managing the challenges of ethnic, religious violence, and therefore must be heeded to so that crises do not snowball into unmanageable dimensions.”⁴ In Nigeria, early warning signals are not taken seriously, as evidenced during the February 2000 Kaduna Sharia crises. Crises which are mainly due to disputes over leadership and distribution of resources can be tackled if an early warning element is applied through the use of informants and the press. This can reduce or even prevent crises when effectively managed and is less expensive as the casualties and costs will be reduced to a minimum. The Ministry of External Affairs needs to put a priority on keeping its finger on the pulse of ethno-religious trends, at least to the same extent as it does in trying to protect government officials.

Use of Preventive Intelligence Gathering

In order for the government and security agencies to have better management of ethnic and religious crises with minimum loss of lives and property, they must maintain formal and informal surveillance at Local Government and District levels for a prompt flow of information to assist the decision making process. This will facilitate a better system of security appraisal and the eventual prevention of crises at minimal time and cost. The Nigerian public could organize the already existing neighborhood watch under the coordination of the police to reduce the cost of preventing crises and crimes in

general. This neighborhood watch could also be a mechanism through which routine assessments of the ethno-religious climates of various communities can be constantly monitored.

Research

The importance of constantly building bodies of knowledge, acquired through research, to the maintain internal security cannot be overstressed. Security agencies need to improve their research and intelligence processing units by engaging experts from various research institutes. This additional facility will strengthen the agencies in the accurate estimation of future events, the interpretation of intentions and capabilities of adversaries, as well as in producing, on a routine basis, daily intelligence that will benefit security elements at all levels.

Recommendations for Further Study

Although this thesis has answered all its primary and secondary research questions, there are many topics pertaining to religious-based violence in Nigeria that need further study. Though, this thesis has touched on governance in Nigeria, there is a need however, for a concerted effort to study more of the system of governance in the country, with more emphasis on corruption and maladministration. The researcher believed, if there is good administration at all levels of government, things will get strengthen and therefore, development will be made possible.

Another area the researcher feels there is a need for further study is the area of arms proliferation in Nigeria. There is the need to make an indepth study and analysis of how arms and ammunition comes and goes out of the country, because the researcher

believed that it is as a result of the porosity of the country's borders. Also, the way and manner sophisticated weapons exchange hands and eventually get to the wrong hands, is another cause for alarm, which require further study.

¹D. Black, *The Manners and Customs of the Police* (New York: Academic Press, 1988).

²A.I. Mawby, *Comparative Policing Issues* (London: Union Hyman Publication, 1990).

³Daily Sun (Lagos, 9 November 2004), 4.

⁴G.W. Hopple, , S.J. Androile, and A. Freedy, *National Security Crises Forecasting and Management* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Dentsch, M. "The Principles and Process of conflict." *Ife Psychology* 9, no. 3 (2001) .4.
- Greeley, M. Andrew. *Religion: A Secular Theory*. New York: Free Press, 1982.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War?* Berkeley: University of California, 1993.
- Nwolise, O.B.C. "*Military Leadership In Nigeria*" *Nigeria Political Leadership Handbook and Who's Who*. Polcrom Limited, Lagos, 1992.
- Peter, Janke. *Ethnic and Religious Conflicts: Europe and Asia*. Dartmouth: Basic Books Inc., 1994.
- Thomas A. Imobighe. *Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria*. Spectrum Book Limited, Ibadan, 2003.

Conference

- Archbishop John Onaiyekan. Vice President of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria, 29 February 2000.
- Paper for the Conference on "Globalization, State Capacity and Self Determination in Muslim Contexts*.
- World Council of Churches' Conference*. Eckerd College, St. Petersburg, Florida, February 8-12, 2002.

Government Documents

- Black, Donald. *The Manners and Customs of the Police*. New York: Academic Press 1988.
- Federal Government of Nigeria. *The Nigeria Police Act*. 1967.
- Federal Government of Nigeria. *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999*. Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1999.

Lectures

Are, LLK. *Meeting the Challenges of National Security*, A Lecture Delivered at the National War College, Abuja, (January 2002).

Buhari S.B. *Intelligence Gathering in Crisis Situation*, Lecture Delivered to Course 13, National War College, Abuja, (23 April 2003.).

Enahoro DO, Major General (Rtd), *Path to Understanding Military Strategy*, A Lecture Delivered at the National War College, Abuja Nigeria, to Participants of Course 13, (20 October 2004.).

Garuba Chris, A. (ed), *Capacity Building for Crisis Management in Africa*. Abuja: National War College, 1998.

Ibrahim, Badamasi B. "*Ethnic Nationalities and the Nigeria State: The Dynamics and Challenges of Governance in a Plural Nigeria*, being Distinguished Annual Lecture, delivered at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 2002.

Rabiu, Kwankwaso, M. *Lecture on National Defense Policy Objectives*, delivered to Participant of National War College, Nigeria, Course 13, (4 January 2005).

Online Sources

Abdullahi, Ali Arazeem and Saka L. *Ethno-Religious and Political Conflicts: Threat to Nigeria Nascent Democracy*, 2007. <http://www.unilorin.edu.ng/unilorin/publications/Ethno.pdf>, (accessed 28 March 2009).

Albert, Einstein. *Quotations of Religious Intolerance*, http://www.religioustolerance.org/quot_intol.htm (accessed 17 March 2009).

Arthur, Schlesinger. *The Cult of Ethnicity, Good and Bad*, 1991. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,973355,00.html> (accessed 14 March 2009).

Between Suicide Bombing and the Burning Banlieues: The Multiple Crises of Europe's Parallel Societies, 2002. http://aei.pitt.edu/6757/01/1350_22.pdf, (accessed 9 April 2009).

Carrie, Meek, P. *Brainy Quotes*, <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/carriepme396175.html> (accessed 17 March 2009).

Case Studies, <http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/casestudy/com2a1.cfm> (accessed 15 February 2009).

Eghosa, Osaghae E. *A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria*, 2005. <http://www.crise.ox.uk/pubs/workingpaper6.pdf>, (accessed 26 January 2009).

- Eghosa, Osaghae, E. *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence*. 1998.
http://books.google.com/books?id=JxaBkN3z28cC&dq=Eghosa+E.+Osaghae,+Crippled+Giant:+Nigeria+Since+Independence&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=vn7Glt_iDp&sig=VWsIT8KoRSJ6ZAIInPtcqLlbYBK4&hl=en&ei=AiLRSbGXHo2usQOj_K2gAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result (accessed 30 March 2009).
- Jamail, Kamlian, A. *Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution*.
<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=www.law.emory.edu%2Ffhr%2Fworlddocs%2Fjamail1.doc+&btnG=Google+Search&aq=f&oq=Philippines%2C+like+m+any+of+the+third+world+countries+in+Southeast+Asia%2C+is+now+seriously+confronted+with+problems+related+to+their+ethnic+and+religious+minority+populations.+> (accessed 27 February 2009).
- Joblessness: Causes Religious Crises*. 2008. <http://www.tellmeonline.net/tag/violence-in-nigeria/> (accessed 14 March 2009).
- Karl, Marx, H. *Critique of the Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, http://quotationspage.com/quotes/Karl_Marx/ (accessed 6 December 2008).
- Lanre Olu-Adeyemi. *Ethno-Religious Conflicts And The Travails of National Integration In Nigeria's Fourth Republic*, 2006. <http://www.dawodu.com/adeyemi3.htm> (accessed 26 January 2009).
- Lemuel, Washburn, K. *Is The Bible Worth Reading? And Other Essays*, 1911
<http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/quotes/washburn.htm> (accessed 16 March 2009).
- Memorandum submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria*, 2002. <http://www.cdd.org.uk/cfcr/presidentialmemorandum.htm>, (accessed 28 December 2008).
- Nigerian troops intensify action against fleeing Islamic militants*, 2004.
<http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040927140350.av6mwpbi.html> (accessed 15 February 2009).
- Obed Minchaku, *Islamic Sect in Nigeria Attacks on Villagers*,
<http://www.wordiq.article/Taliban.com> (accessed 20 September 2008).
- Osinubi, Tokunbo S. and Oladipupo Sunday Osinubi. *Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Africa: The Nigerian Experience*. 2006. <http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JSS/JSS-12-0-000-000-2006-Web/JSS-12-2-083-158-2006-Abst-Text/JSS-12-2-083-158-2006-Web/JSS-12-2-101-114-2006-165-Osinubi-T-S/JSS-12-2-101-114-2006-165-Osinubi-T-S-Text.pdf>, (accessed 30 March 2009).

- Peter, Pham J. *Strategic Interest World Defense Review*, 2007.
<http://worlddefensereview.com/pham020107.shtml> (accessed 15 February 2009).
- Pollefeyt, Didier. *Religious (In) Tolerance and Religious Education in Nigeria: A Call for a Paradigm Shift*, <http://www.kuleuven.be/research/researchdatabase/project/3H07/3H070660.htm> (accessed 14 March 2009).
- National Security Coordination Secretariat. 2008. *Report of a Workshop Jointly Organized by the Centre of Excellence for National Security, (Singapore) and the Global Futures Forum International with the Support of the National Security Coordination Secretariat (Singapore)*. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/conference_reports/RSIS_GFF_Report_100708.pdf (accessed 27 February 2009).
- Religion in the West*. <http://islambyquestion.net/religion/west.html> (accessed 6 December 2008).
- Religious Violence-Wikipedia. the Free Encyclopedia*. http://en.wikipedia.org/Wiki/Religious_violence (accessed 26 October 2008).
- Scientology: Religion and Spirituality in Society*, <http://www.accepteds Scientology.net/page04.htm> (accessed 6 December 2008).
- Stefan Hartwig, *Tension in Nigeria*, <http://www.wordiq.com> (accessed 20 September 2008).
- Stephen, Hayes, D. *Religion–The Secret Weapon’ in Resolving Religious-based Conflicts*, 2005. http://www.icrd.org/storage/icrd/documents/religion_secret_weapon.pdf (accessed 27 February 2009).
- Theorizing Peace Education*. <http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cac> (accessed 6 December 2008).
- Theorizing Peace Education, A Theoretical Survey of the Practice of Peace Education*. <http://henry.ub.uit.no/munin/bitstream/10037/149/1/thesis.pdf>, (accessed 8 April 2009).
- Thomas, Carlyle. *Quotations and Famous Quotes of Thomas Carlyle*. <http://en.proverbia.net/citasautor.asp?autor=11324&page=3> (accessed 17 March 2009).
- Tony, Oyatedor *How to stop violence, religious crises in Nigeria.*, 2009.
<http://news.onlinenigeria.com/templates/?a=859&z=12> (accessed 8 April 2009).
- Ukoha, Ukiwo, *Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, 2003. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=143615> (accessed 8 April 2009).

United States Department of States, *Country Report on Terrorism 2007 – Nigeria*, 2008.
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOS,,NGA,,48196c9a1a,0.html>
(accessed 15 February 2009).

Vasudev, D.A.S. 2006. *Resolving Religious Crisis for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, Institute for Applied Spiritual Technology, Ibadan, Nigeria.
http://www.cesnur.org/2006/sd_das.htm (accessed 14 March 2009).

Zangon-Kataf: *For Peace to Endure*, 2004. <http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/09/09/20010909news03.html> (accessed 25 March 2009).

Periodicals

Abdullahi, Bego, *Taliban' of Nigeria: Who Are They?* (Weekly_Trust, Abuja; 3 – 9 January 2004), 2.

Daily Sun, (Lagos, 9 November 2004), 4.

Ethnic and Religious Rights Quarterly 1, no.1 (October 1999.), 9-10.

Publications

Abdulrafiu L. “*The Rout of the ‘Talibans’*,” (TELL, 19 January 2004), 27.

Doi, Abdul Rahman, I. *Islam in Nigeria* (Zaria, Nigeria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964.), 210.

Marta, Reynal-Querol, *Religion, Ethnicity, Political System and Civil War*, (Bellaterra-Barcelona, Spain: Institute of Analysis Economic) 2002.

Reports

Dalhatu Ja'afar, *Investigation Panel Report on Kaduna Religious Crises* of (February and May 2000), 8.

Details of the “Yobe Taliban Crises of 2003”, report compiled for State Security Council Deliberation, January 2004.

Kano and Kaduna States State Security Service Progress Reports on Security Situations in the States during the Kaduna State Ethnic and Religious Crisis of 2001.

National War College. *Report of National Workshop on Ethnic Militias, Democracy and National Security*, (Abuja, 2006.), 5.

Police Investigation Report on Misappropriation of Relief Funds for the February 2000 Kaduna Sharia/Religious crisis.

Police Investigation Report on Kaduna Sharia Religious Crisis of February 2000.

Police Report and Nigerian Army Report on Kaduna State Crisis Submitted to Justice Dalhatu Ja'afaru Investigation Panel, June 2001.

Police Investigation Report on Gwantu Religious Crisis of November 2001.

Police Investigation Report, Kaduna State, 2001.

Police Investigation Reports of Kaduna and Kafanchan Crises.

Police Investigation Report from personal interrogation.

Presidential Committee, *Memorandum Submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria*, (8 February 2002).

Report by the State Security Service to the Executive Governor of Yobe State, S. 1/2069 of 12 August 2003.

Report to the Executive Governor of Yobe State, TS.7/289 of 25 November 2003.

Report of National Workshop on Ethnic Militias, Democracy and National Security, National War College, Abuja 2006, 5.

Report of National Workshop on Ethnic Militias, Democracy and National Security, (National War College, Abuja), 2006, 5.

Surveys

Abubakar,D. *“In Search of Ethnic and Cultural Identity: A General Survey of Conflicts in the North-East Zone of Nigeria*, in Ibid, 35-68.

Bassey, Celestine. *General Survey of Conflict in the South-South Zone of Nigeria*, in Ibid, 111-128.

Dunmoye, Ayo, R. *General Survey of Conflicts in the Middle Belt Zone of Nigeria*, (Africa Peace Review, Special Edition, 2003).

Nnoli, Okwudiba. *General Survey of Conflicts in the South-East Zone of Nigeria*, in Ibid. 69-90.

Other Sources

Abdulrafiu. *The Routing of the Talibans*, Newswatch, 4 October 2004.

Akoma, U. *“The State Security Service and Management of Internal Security in Nigeria, 1999 – 2003”*, project submitted to National War College; (May 5, 2004).

- Ashiwaju, G and Abubakar, Y. (eds). *Nigeria Since Independence – the First Twenty five Years* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989), 71-97.
- Basri, Gibor. *Nigeria and Sharia: Aspirations and Apprehensions*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundations, 1994.
- Creswell, John W. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage).
- Egwu, Samuel, G. *Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria, Jos: African Centre for Democratic Governance, (AFRIGOV)*. 2001.
- Ekoko, A. and Vpgt, M. (eds). *Nigerian Defense Policy: Issues and Problems*. Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1990.
- Griffin, M. *Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Q'aida and the Holy War*. London: Pluto Press, 2003.
- Hopple, G.W, Androile, S.J and Freedy, A. *National Security Crises Forecasting and Management*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984..
- Isawa, Elaigwu, J. And Akindele, RA. (eds), *Foundation of Nigerian Federalism, 1960-1995*. Jos Institute of Governance and Social Research, 1996.
- Mawby, A.I. *Comparative Policing Issues*. London: Union Hyman Publication 1999.
- Nigerian Troops intensify action against fleeing Islamic militants.*
- Powell, G.B. *Contemporary Democracies, Participation, Stability and Violence*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Spolar, Christine. "Ethnicity in African Conflicts." *Washington Post*, (12 March 1997), 40.
- William, Browne P. *Crisis Management*, in Baylis, J, et al, *Contemporary Strategy*. New York Holmes and Meier, 1987.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Mr Douglas Lathrop
Department of Joint and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr Michael Burke
Department of Joint and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr Michael Mihalka
Department of Joint and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301